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The Loudest Voice at the Supreme
Court: The Solicitor General’s
Dominance of Amicus Oral Argument
Darcy Covert*
Annie J. Wang**
The Solicitor General (“SG”) is often called the “Tenth Justice,” a title
that captures his unique relationship with the Supreme Court and his
independence from the executive branch. No phenomenon better reflects this
relationship than the Court’s practice of permitting amici to participate in oral
argument. Although amicus oral argument is nominally available to all
litigants, the modern Court grants this privilege almost exclusively to the SG.
Scholars and Court watchers have long argued that this practice is justified
because the SG uses it to pursue the rule of law and an objective sense
of “justice.”
This Article challenges that account. The SG’s dominance of amicus
oral argument is a relatively recent phenomenon. In the early 1900s, the SG
requested amicus oral argument almost exclusively to defend federal statutes or
federal agency action. During this time, the Court granted all his amicus oral
argument requests. But, over time, SGs increasingly entered political cases with
only tenuous connections to the federal government. During the late 1980s, the
Court became skeptical of the SG’s political independence; in response, it denied
seventeen percent of his amicus oral argument motions, and individual Justices
criticized him in internal memoranda. Thirty years later, the Court permits the
SG to argue as an amicus in almost any case he wants, even though he
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increasingly weighs in on politically charged cases with de minimis
implications for the federal government.
This new equilibrium has profound consequences. By permitting the SG
to be heard any time he asks, the Court systematically biases the perspectives
that it hears. This bias undermines due process principles and the adversarial
system, and it ignores the Court’s own history and rules. We offer a proposal
for reform.
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INTRODUCTION
In April 2020, the United States Supreme Court did something
it had not done in nearly a decade: it denied a motion by the Office of
the Solicitor General of the United States (“OSG”) to participate in oral
argument as amicus.1 While many litigants file amicus briefs at the
Court, amicus oral argument is a rare occurrence for every litigant
except the OSG. Between the 2010 and 2019 Terms, the Court granted
only fifteen of forty-three motions for amicus oral argument by litigants
other than the OSG.2 During that time, it granted 306 amicus oral
argument motions—all but one—by the OSG. April’s denial, which was
for an argument set in the 2020 Term, was the first since 2011.
To most Supreme Court litigators and other Court watchers, the
Solicitor General’s (“SG”) dominance of amicus oral argument is taken
as a matter of course.3 The SG directs all appellate litigation involving
the federal government and represents it before the Supreme Court.4
The SG’s relationship with the Court is so unique that he5 is often called
the “Tenth Justice.”6 This title captures the SG’s long-standing, self1.
Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 140 S. Ct. 2665 (mem.) (2020).
2.
Throughout this Article, we define a “motion” as a request to argue in a “case,” where
cases are organized by citation rather than by docket number. In many instances, cases ultimately
consolidated into a single opinion were also consolidated for oral argument. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd.
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (consolidating cases from Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and
Delaware). As a result, counting each motion by docket number would artificially inflate the
frequency of amicus oral argument. By the same token, if a party requests oral argument in
multiple cases in a single motion, we consider that multiple motions (where the number of motions
is equal to the number of resulting opinions).
3.
See, e.g., Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Solicitor General’s
Changing Role in Supreme Court Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1323, 1331 (2010) (suggesting that
Supreme Court procedure encourages SG participation as amicus curiae); Patricia A. Millett, We’re
Your Government and We’re Here to Help: Obtaining Amicus Support from the Federal Government
in Supreme Court Cases, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 209, 227 & n.33 (2009) (discussing the role
the OSG can play in advocacy).
4.
Cordray & Cordray, supra note 3, at 1326.
5.
With the exception of Elena Kagan, every SG has been male. See OFF. OF THE SOLIC. GEN.,
About the Office, DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/osg/historical-bios (last visited Feb. 4,
2021) [https://perma.cc/4F5S-GHFC]. Therefore, we use the pronoun “he” to refer to the SG.
6.
See generally LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE
RULE OF LAW (1987).
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proclaimed commitment to “justice”—“a voice that speaks on behalf of
the rule of law”7—rather than to victory in any given case.
This Article challenges this conventional account. Far from
being static, the SG’s relationship to the Court has evolved dramatically
over the last century. No practice better reflects this dynamic than
amicus oral argument, which provides a rare signal of which litigants
the otherwise-opaque Court favors. Over the last twenty years, the OSG
has argued in 69%–88% of the Court’s cases; over half of those
arguments were as an amicus. Our comprehensive historical analysis
of every motion for amicus oral argument demonstrates that the SG’s
current rate of arguing as an amicus is a relatively modern
phenomenon. As recently as the late 1980s, the Court refused 17% of
the SG’s requests—reaching a high of 28% in the 1987 Term—and
criticized him in private memoranda.
This often-ignored period challenges, as both a descriptive and
normative matter, the conventional view that the SG’s outsized
presence at amicus oral argument is benign. Descriptively, our analysis
shows that the Court could—and once did—respond more critically to
the SG’s attempts to use his influence to advance the president’s
political objectives rather than the long-term interests of the federal
government. Normatively, this period highlights the vast procedural
and substantive consequences of permitting the SG to regularly argue
as amicus.
Indeed, while discussing the OSG’s participation as an amicus
and as a party in roughly 80% of the Court’s cases, then-Judge (and
former Principal Deputy Solicitor General) John G. Roberts remarked:
If you asked me as an abstract proposition whether I would be troubled by the idea that
the executive branch was going to file something in every case before the Supreme Court
explaining its views, as a sort of super law clerk, my answer would be yes, I would find
that very troubling. Eighty percent is pretty close to every case . . . .8

Today, Chief Justice Roberts is one of four current Justices who
previously worked at the OSG.9
Amicus oral argument distorts the adversarial process by taking
argument time from one of the parties and allocating it elsewhere. In
addition, amici are encouraged to offer legal arguments not advanced
7.
Seth P. Waxman, “Presenting the Case of the United States As It Should Be”: The Solicitor
General in Historical Context, J. SUP. CT. HIST., no. 2, 1998, at 3, 4.
8.
John G. Roberts, Jr., Oral Advocacy and the Re-Emergence of a Supreme Court Bar, 30 J.
SUP. CT. HIST. 68, 79 (2005).
9.
Current Members, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/
biographies.aspx (last visited Dec. 21, 2020) [https://perma.cc/2CHR-FRH6]. The four Justices are
Elena Kagan (SG, 2009–10), John G. Roberts, Jr. (Principal Deputy SG, 1989–93), Samuel A. Alito,
Jr. (Assistant to the SG, 1981–85), and Brett M. Kavanaugh (Bristow Fellow, 1992–93).
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by the parties, which may undermine or derail a party’s arguments.
Amici who argue at the Court also have an opportunity to influence the
substantive development of the law. The SG’s choice to participate more
frequently as an amicus than as a party evidences that he recognizes
this fact.
Scrutinizing the SG’s special place at the Court seems
particularly apt at this moment in history. Recently departed SG Noel
Francisco is widely perceived as having tested the outer limits of the
Tenth Justice reputation—through requests for extraordinary relief,10
appeals to overturn precedent,11 and switches in position in individual
cases.12 The last time Court watchers were this concerned about the
OSG’s commitment to the rule of law was during SG Charles Fried’s
tenure, addressed in Lincoln Caplan’s seminal account of the office, The
Tenth Justice.13 One difference between the two periods, however, is
that while the Court rebuked Fried’s bolder stances, it generally
embraced Francisco’s.14
Despite a substantial literature discussing the SG generally, no
scholarship has examined the OSG’s outsized presence at amicus oral
argument. Yet amicus oral argument is one of the rare signals the Court
sends about whose opinions it values. Because the Justices must
affirmatively allocate a scare resource—argument time—amicus oral
argument is a uniquely important lens through which to analyze the
Court’s behavior.
Our account of the OSG’s participation in amicus oral argument
makes three novel contributions to the existing literature on the SG’s
influence at the Court. First, it offers the first quantitative and
qualitative history of the practice of amicus oral argument before the
Court. Using 131 volumes of the annual Journal of the Supreme Court

10. See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, The Solicitor General and the Shadow Docket, 133 HARV. L.
REV. 123, 124 (2019).
11. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Trump Administration Asks Supreme Court to Overrule
Precedent Helping Unions, WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
courts_law/trump-administration-asks-supreme-court-to-overrule-precedent-helping-unions/
2017/12/06/64794b1a-dabc-11e7-b1a8 62589434a581_story.html [https://perma.cc/678E-VRTJ].
12. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Trump’s Legal U-Turns May Test Supreme Court’s Patience,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/28/us/politics/trump-supremecourt.html [https://perma.cc/ZV5T-RDWH] (describing how the Trump Administration abandoned
positions previously held by the Obama Administration).
13. CAPLAN, supra note 6.
14. See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 10, at 126 (noting that the Court granted “most” of SG
Francisco’s requests for emergency and extraordinary relief and that even the Court’s denials have
come with “no suggestion” that the SG “is abusing his unique position, taking advantage of his
special relationship with the Court, or otherwise acting in a manner unbecoming the office
he holds”).
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of the United States, we constructed a dataset of every motion for
amicus oral argument filed from the 1889 through 2019 Terms,
including the litigant who filed the motion and the Court’s ruling on it.
Using these data, we chart more than a century—and likely close to the
entirety15—of this practice.
Our qualitative account of this practice identifies the types of
cases in which amici request oral argument from the Court and how
they have changed over time. We develop this analysis using original
archival research on the Justices’ papers and interviews with frequent
Supreme Court litigators, including current and former members of the
OSG. This research underlies our account of when the Court grants
amicus oral argument and why, when doing so, the Court has so often
heard from the OSG.
Second, this Article synthesizes and rebuts the most common
justifications for the OSG’s outsized participation in this practice and
the SG’s reputation as the Tenth Justice more broadly. We argue, for
the first time, that the SG’s ability to perform the Tenth Justice role
stems from a procedural abnormality: his lack of a readily identifiable
client. This allows the OSG to ignore the ethical and professional rules
that bind every other lawyer. The type of “independence” the OSG is
thought to have is possible only because it does not have a client whose
interests it must serve and defend.
Finally, we offer the first normative account of when the Court
should grant amicus oral argument to any litigant. We center this
account in the Court’s dual objectives of upholding due process for
individual litigants while also “resolv[ing] public policy issues of
national importance.”16 We suggest that the Court should grant
argument to only two categories of amici: those who have a concrete
interest in the litigation and have put forth new legal reasoning that is
useful to the Court’s decisionmaking process; and those who, regardless
of interest, have raised a completely new legal issue the Court should
address to decide the case.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a brief
overview of the relevant concepts and justifies the use of amicus oral
argument as a lens through which to examine the OSG and its

15. See infra Section II.B.1 (describing the rarity of amicus oral argument through the 1930s).
16. Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal
Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1267, 1273 n.29 (2001)
(quoting Peter G. Fish, Judiciary Act of 1925, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES 476, 477 (Kermit L. Hall, Joel B. Grossman & William M. Wiecek
eds., 1992)).
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relationship with the Court.17 Substantively, oral argument is a
significant component of Supreme Court practice. It is also the only
time an amicus is guaranteed to be heard by the Justices.18 Oral
argument may inform and persuade in ways that a written brief does
not, and many social scientists have demonstrated how oral argument
may inform the Justices’ thinking.19 Because total argument time is
limited, the Court’s decision to permit an amicus to argue also helps
elucidate which litigants it values.
Part II employs a mixed-methods approach to construct an
original quantitative and qualitative history of the practice of amicus
oral argument. Using our novel dataset of Supreme Court amicus oral
argument motions practice, we show how the past sixty years have seen
a dramatic rise in the number of requests for amicus oral argument.
Most of this increase is attributable to the OSG. We also draw on
Supreme Court history from the late nineteenth century to today to
chart the evolution of amicus oral argument before the Court. By
documenting the cases in which amici have asked for and received
permission to participate at oral argument, we trace how this practice
has changed throughout history.
Part III examines three possible justifications for the OSG’s
outsized access to amicus oral argument and evaluates them in the
modern context. Drawing on interviews with top Supreme Court
litigators and other original historical research, we identify three key
advantages that the OSG is thought to possess over other litigants: a
staff of skilled lawyers who are experts in Supreme Court litigation, an
ability to collect and communicate information from federal agencies,
and the Tenth Justice reputation.
These explanations, however, do not justify the Court’s current
amicus oral argument practice. The development of the modern
Supreme Court bar has dramatically improved the quality of oral
argument in many cases and reduced the OSG’s historical advantage in
this area. Additionally, the OSG does not frequently present otherwise
unavailable information about agency operations in its amicus briefs
and arguments, and when it has done so, the information has not
always been reliable. Finally, the OSG’s amicus positions do not
necessarily reflect the traditional Tenth Justice values. Absent
17. Although there are many facets of the OSG’s influence at the Court, including its
exemption from the requirement of obtaining either party permission or leave of court to file an
amicus brief, see SUP. CT. R. 37.4, this Article considers only amicus oral argument.
18. James L. Cooper, The Solicitor General and the Evolution of Activism, 65 IND. L.J. 675,
693 (1990).
19. Infra note 41 and accompanying text.
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legitimate reasons to give preference to the OSG over other possible
amici at oral argument, the Court should apply the same criteria for
granting OSG and non-OSG amicus oral argument motions.
Part IV proposes criteria the Court should apply when deciding
whether to grant an amicus oral argument motion. We argue that our
framework would promote due process, sound substantive outcomes,
pragmatism, and legitimacy better than the Court’s current practice.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE AMICUS ROLE,
ORAL ARGUMENT, AND THE OSG
The amicus curiae role at the Supreme Court, and especially
amicus participation at oral argument, has changed markedly over the
last century and a half. To contextualize those changes, we provide an
overview of the amicus role, oral argument, and the OSG as an
institution. We also explain why amicus oral argument is a useful lens
for examining the OSG’s influence at the Court.
A. The Amicus Role
The term “amicus curiae” means “friend of the court.”20 At
English common law, amici were viewed as inimical to the adversarial
system, and courts resisted advocacy by amici who had an interest in
the litigation.21 Thus, amicus participation was limited to nonlitigants
who helped the court avoid errors by giving impartial advice.22 In the
American system, the amicus curiae role quickly departed from a
neutral error checker to something resembling a traditional advocate
who sought to help one of the parties.23
The Court implores organizations and individuals to file amicus
briefs only if they “bring[ ] to the attention of the Court relevant matter
not already brought to its attention by the parties.”24 When an amicus
supports a particular party, the amicus can strengthen the party’s
position by fleshing out its arguments or offering new ones. When an
amicus writes in support of neither party, it often hopes to help the
Court by setting out an alternative path.
20. Allison Orr Larsen & Neal Devins, The Amicus Machine, 102 VA. L. REV. 1901,
1902 (2016).
21. See Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J.
694, 696 (1963).
22. Michael K. Lowman, The Litigating Amicus Curiae: When Does the Party Begin After the
Friends Leave?, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1243, 1244 (1992); Krislov, supra note 21, at 694–95.
23. Krislov, supra note 21, at 697; Lowman, supra note 22, at 1244–45.
24. SUP. CT. R. 37.1.
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Most amici may file briefs only with the permission of both
parties, or with leave from the Court.25 All amicus briefs must explain
the author’s “interest” in the litigation.26 The Court’s attitude towards
amici has varied over the years: sometimes it seeks them out, and
other times it castigates them for presenting repetitive and
political arguments.27
Today, parties (including the OSG) typically grant blanket
consent to amicus briefs.28 Nevertheless, the modern amicus brief is so
carefully orchestrated by the parties that practitioners have termed it
the “amicus machine.”29 In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,30 for example,
Petitioners’ attorney Neal Katyal handpicked thirty-seven amici and
labeled each brief with the proposition it supported.31
Despite the time and resources that parties put into organizing
and coordinating amici, the Justices very likely do not read all the
amicus briefs in a given case. Justices often rely on their clerks to read
most briefs, while personally examining only a few.32 Empirical
evidence shows that although citations to amicus briefs are on the rise,
those citations represent only a small fraction of the briefs submitted in
a case.33 To guarantee that the Justices will hear its viewpoint, an
amicus must argue before the Court.
B. Amicus Oral Argument
Amicus oral argument is significant both for its substantive
value and because the decision to grant it reveals the Justices’
preferences for certain amici. Despite its importance, no scholar has
examined amicus oral argument in any depth.
Serving on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, then-Judge Roberts said that “oral argument is terribly,
terribly important” because it allows the judges to hear what their
colleagues think of the case through the questions they ask and

25. Id. 37.2, 37.4.
26. Id. 37.2(b), 37.3(b), 37.5.
27. See infra notes 354-356 and accompanying text.
28. Larsen & Devins, supra note 20, at 1925.
29. Id. at 1906.
30. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
31. Larsen & Devins, supra note 20, at 1924–25.
32. Kelly J. Lynch, Best Friends? Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effective Amicus Curiae
Briefs, 20 J.L. & POL. 33, 43–46 (2004).
33. Anthony J. Franze & R. Reeves Anderson, Supreme Court Amicus Curiae Review: ‘Friends
of the Court’ Roared Back in 2017–18 Term, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 16, 2018.
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comments they make.34 Justice Anthony Kennedy, before retiring in
2018, saw oral argument as a means of communicating with his
colleagues and believed that it made a difference to case outcomes.35
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg,36 Antonin Scalia,37 and William H.
Rehnquist38 also believed that oral argument could have significant
impact in some cases.
Over the years, a few Justices have maintained that oral
argument is insignificant, but they are in the minority. Justice Clarence
Thomas famously stated: “I don’t see the need for all those questions. I
think Justices, 99 percent of the time, have their minds made up when
they go to the bench.”39 Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., has said that “[o]ral
argument is a relatively small and, truth be told, a relatively
unimportant part of what we do.”40
Empirical research suggests that oral argument does matter,
subject to some disagreement over when and why. Several political
scientists have used notes kept by former Justices Harry A. Blackmun
and Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to conclude that, controlling for variables like
the Justice’s ideology and a case’s complexity, the Justices’ votes in a
case depend significantly on the quality of the advocate appearing
before the Court.41 Others have looked to the content of the Justices’
34. Roberts, supra note 8, at 69. See generally James C. Phillips & Edward L. Carter, Source
of Information or “Dog and Pony Show”?: Judicial Information Seeking During U.S. Supreme
Court Oral Argument, 1963-1965 & 2004-2009, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 79, 88–92 (2010).
35. DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 248 (7th
ed. 2005).
36. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Appellate Advocacy, 50 S.C. L. REV. 567, 570 (1999)
(describing oral argument as a “hold-the-line operation” and noting that a bad oral argument can
swing a potential winner to a loser but rarely the reverse).
37. Timothy R. Johnson, James F. Spriggs II & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Oral Advocacy Before the
United States Supreme Court: Does It Affect the Justices’ Decisions?, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 457, 458
(2007) (“Things . . . can be put in perspective during oral argument in a way that they can’t in a
written brief.” (quoting Justice Antonin Scalia)).
38. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 243–44 (Knopf Doubleday Publ’g Grp.
2007) (noting that oral argument made a difference to his decision in a “significant minority” of
cases, especially when the case presented unfamiliar legal issues).
39. Phillips & Carter, supra note 34, at 92 (quoting Terry Rombeck, Justice Takes Time for
Q & A, LAWRENCE J.-WORLD (Oct. 30, 2002), http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2002/oct/30/
justice_takes_time [https://perma.cc/UHX5-74EG].
40. Terry M. Richman, Alito: Prep More Important than Oral Arguments, N.Y. DAILY
REC. (May 17, 2011), https://nydailyrecord.com/2011/05/17/alito-prep-more-important-than-oralarguments [https://perma.cc/VXR5-9DFJ].
41. See, e.g., Eve M. Ringsmuth, Amanda C. Bryan & Timothy R. Johnson, Voting Fluidity
and Oral Argument on the U.S. Supreme Court, 66 POL. RSCH. Q. 429, 434–35 (2013) (“As . . . the
opposed attorney becomes more skilled, Blackmun and Powell’s probability of switching positions
increases nearly 30 percent from the lowest vale of quality differential to the highest.”); Timothy
R. Johnson, Paul J. Wahlbeck & James F. Spriggs, II, The Influence of Oral Arguments on the U.S.
Supreme Court, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 99, 111–12 (2006) (using quantitative measures to
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questions at oral argument to determine what role the practice might
play for the Justices themselves. Using conference notes from several
of the Justices, political scientist Timothy R. Johnson found that
information discussed only at oral arguments constituted nearly half of
the issues discussed at conference and over a quarter of the issues in
case syllabi.42
In addition to the substantive value of oral argument, the
Court’s decision to grant amicus oral argument is a meaningful signal
from an otherwise-opaque institution. When the Court grants certiorari
in a case, each side automatically receives thirty minutes of argument
time.43 If there are multiple parties on one side, the parties may seek
permission to divide the argument in a motion that “set[s] out
specifically and concisely why more than one attorney should be
allowed to argue.”44 But the Court stresses that “[d]ivided argument is
not favored.”45
Oral argument time is a limited resource at the Court, and the
Justices must affirmatively allocate such time to amici. Although the
Court does not make public how many votes are needed to grant amicus
oral argument, our archival research suggests it takes five.46 The
demonstrate that “justices are more likely to vote for the litigant whose attorney provided higher
quality oral advocacy . . . even after controlling for ideological considerations”); Johnson et al.,
supra note 37, at 524 (“[E]vidence clearly indicates that the Justices’ votes in a case depend
substantially on the relative quality of the lawyers appearing before the Court.”). But see Andrea
McAtee & Kevin T. McGuire, Lawyers, Justices, and Issue Salience: When and How Do Legal
Arguments Affect the U.S. Supreme Court?, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 259, 260 (2007) (concluding that
the quality of oral advocates affects case outcomes primarily “when the justices’ informational
needs are high and the intensity of their predispositions is low”).
42. TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON, ORAL ARGUMENTS AND DECISION MAKING ON THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 80, 99 (2011).
43. SUP. CT. R. 16.2, 28.3.
44. Id. 28.4.
45. Id.
46. The Supreme Court Rules do not expressly state the number of votes required to grant a
motion. But based on Justice Blackmun’s papers, which contain many conference memoranda in
which the motions for amicus oral argument were discussed, we believe five votes are required.
When five Justices voted in favor of a motion for amicus oral argument, the motion was
granted, as was the case in the ACLU’s motion for amicus oral argument in Solorio v. United
States. See, e.g., Memorandum for the Conference from Chief Justice at 8–9 (Aug. 29, 1986), in
Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Library of Congress [hereinafter Blackmun Papers], Box 458, Folder
11 (showing a vote against Motion 12); Memorandum from Justice White (Sept. 9, 1986), id. (voting
against); Memorandum from Justice Rehnquist (Sept. 3, 1986), id. (voting against); Memorandum
from Justice Marshall (Sept. 3, 1986), id. (voting against); Memorandum from Justice O’Connor
(Sept. 8, 1986), id. (voting to grant); Memorandum from Justice Powell (Sept. 4, 1986), id. (voting
to grant); Memorandum from Justice Stevens (Sept. 3, 1986), id. (voting to grant); Memorandum
from Harry Blackmun (Sept. 2, 1986), id. (voting to grant); Memorandum from Justice Brennan
(Sept. 9, 1986), id. (voting to grant). Because these votes were expressed through official
memoranda, we can be confident in the split of votes. The requirement of five votes was also
reflected in Blackmun’s handwritten annotations. See Memorandum for the Conference from Chief
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Court’s decision to permit an amicus to argue is an unusually direct
signal that the Court is interested in the amicus’s views. Because
parties generally grant blanket permission for amici to file briefs,47 and
because the Court almost always grants leave to file a brief even when
the parties do not give permission,48 the filing of an amicus brief on its
own is not a measure of influence. On the other hand, looking solely at
whether an amicus brief is cited is too narrow a measure. Amicus briefs
may be influential even without being cited.49 The decision to allow an
amicus to argue, by contrast, reflects the views of five Justices that the
amicus will use that time in a way that is more useful to the Court than
would the party the amicus supports.
The mechanics of amicus oral argument are governed by the
Supreme Court Rules. Although the practice of amicus oral argument
began much earlier, it first appeared in the Rules in 1954:
Counsel for an amicus curiae . . . may, with the consent of a party, argue orally on the side
of such party . . . . In the absence of such consent, argument by counsel for an amicus
curiae may be made only by special leave of court, on motion particularly setting forth
why such argument is thought to provide assistance to the court not otherwise available.
Such motions, unless made on behalf of the United States or of a State, Territory,
Commonwealth, or Possession, are not favored.50

The 1954 Rule distinguished between motions made with and
without the consent of the party the amicus supports, noting that
motions in the latter category were “not favored” unless they came from
a government entity.51 The 1980 Rules eliminated this preference and
set a higher bar for all parties: without the consent of the party it
supports, an amicus’s motion for amicus oral argument “will be granted
Justice at 1 (Feb. 9, 1985), id. at Box 409, Folder 9 (including handwritten annotations from
Blackmun that five Justices voted in favor of the SG’s motion for amicus oral argument in Gould
v. Ruefenacht); Memorandum for the Conference from Chief Justice at 1 (Sept. 10, 1987), id. at
Box 485, Folder 12 (same with respect to Boos v. Berry). By contrast, when only four Justices voted
to grant a motion, the motion was denied. Memorandum for the Conference from Chief Justice at
2–3 (Dec. 10, 1987), id. (including handwritten annotations from Blackmun that four Justices
voted in favor of the SG’s motion for amicus oral argument in United States v. Providence Journal
Co.). In Basic Inc. v. Levinson, the Chief Justice was recused from the case, and the Justices split
four to grant and four to deny. The motion was denied. Memorandum from Chief Justice at 2 (May
27, 1987), id. at Box 458, Folder 12.
47. Paul M. Collins Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus Curiae
Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 807, 809 (2004).
48. Eugene Volokh, Should U.S. Supreme Court Litigants Decline Consent for Filing of
Amicus Briefs?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 28, 2018), https://reason.com/2018/04/28/should-ussupreme-court-litigants-declin [https://perma.cc/C97P-DK2G].
49. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on
the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 844–45 (2000) (describing flaws in using citations as a
measure of an amicus influence).
50. SUP. CT. R. 44.7 (1954) (repealed 1980).
51. Id.
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only in the most extraordinary circumstances.”52 This standard persists
through the 2019 Rules.53
C. The Court’s Foremost Amicus: The OSG
As we discuss in Part II, the OSG is by far the most frequent
participant in amicus oral argument. The OSG has a role in the federal
government’s litigation in lower courts,54 but it is best known for
representing the U.S. government before the Supreme Court.
The only federal officer required to be “learned in the law,”55 the
SG has traditionally held a dual allegiance. He is an executive officer
appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate who reports to
the Attorney General (“AG”) and works within the Department of
Justice (“DOJ”).56 But he also has a second office, a few blocks away, at
the Supreme Court.57 His two offices reflect his two roles: the SG is an
executive branch officer, but as the federal government’s chief appellate
litigator, he has a close relationship with the Court. Together, they are
emblematic of his role as the “Tenth Justice,” a distinction we discuss
further in Part III.
The OSG has long enjoyed special deference from the Court. At
the certiorari stage, the Court sometimes “call[s] for the views” of the
SG (“CVSG”) on whether to grant certiorari in a case.58 The OSG and
other governmental litigants may file an amicus brief without the
parties’ consent.59 They are also permitted one thousand words more
than other amici.60 And as discussed in Part II, the Court almost always
grants the OSG’s amicus oral argument motions, even though it almost
always denies such motions from other parties.
These advantages are significant: the OSG enjoys an
unparalleled success rate before the Court. Since the 1950s, the Court
has granted around 70% of the OSG’s certiorari petitions, compared
with approximately 3% of other petitions.61 According to political
scientists Ryan C. Black and Ryan J. Owens, even the Justices who
52. SUP. CT. R. 38.7 (1980).
53. SUP. CT. R. 28.7.
54. 28 C.F.R. § 0.20(a)-(c) (2020).
55. 28 U.S.C. § 505.
56. Id.
57. Waxman, supra note 7, at 3 n.4.
58. Stefanie A. Lepore, The Development of the Supreme Court Practice of Calling for the
Views of the Solicitor General, 35 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 35, 35 (2010).
59. SUP. CT. R. 37.4.
60. Id. 33.1(g).
61. Cordray & Cordray, supra note 3, at 1333.
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disagreed with the SG’s policy preferences followed his
recommendations 35% of the time.62 The Justices follow the SG’s lead
“when they are ideologically distant from her, when they disagree with
her on policy grounds, and when her recommendation contravenes the
legal factors in the case—in short, when the only persuasive component
of the SG’s argument is that it is being made by the SG.”63
The OSG is similarly successful at the merits stage. In the
second half of the twentieth century, the OSG won 60%–70% of the
cases in which it represented a party.64 The side that the OSG supports
as an amicus has a historical win rate of 70%–80%.65 In a study of cases
in which the OSG participated as a party from the 1979 through the
2007 Terms, Black and Owens found that the OSG lawyers were more
likely to win than their opponents, even after controlling for the party’s
resources or the opposing attorney’s experience.66 Although similar
research suggests that the OSG’s politicization—defined as the
percentage of briefs that match the ideology of the appointing
president—decreases its success rate, the predicted probability of
success on the merits is still 60% at a hypothetical maximum level
of politicization.67
Despite a substantial literature discussing the SG generally, few
scholars have addressed his role in amicus oral argument. The most
extensive treatment comes from prominent Supreme Court litigators,
including now-Chief Justice Roberts and now-D.C. Circuit Judge
Patricia Millet, offering advice to private litigants on how to gain the
OSG’s support as amicus.68 Scholars have often mentioned the OSG’s
role in amicus oral argument in passing but have not discussed the
practice or its historical development in any detail.69 Even critics of the
62. Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, Solicitor General Influence and Agenda Setting on the
U.S. Supreme Court, 64 POL. RSCH. Q. 765, 772 (2011). Black and Owens calculate specific votes
by relying on Justice Blackmun’s papers, which record individual votes to grant or deny certiorari.
Id. at 769 & n.7.
63. Id. at 771.
64. Cordray & Cordray, supra note 3, at 1335.
65. Id.
66. Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, A Built-In Advantage: The Office of the Solicitor General
and the U.S. Supreme Court, 66 POL. RSCH. Q. 454, 461 (2013) (“[H]olding everything else equal,
attorneys from the OSG can expect a 0.13 increase in the probability that their side will win the
case . . . [that] is attributable exclusively to the OSG’s participation in the case.”).
67. Patrick C. Wohlfarth, The Tenth Justice? Consequences of Politicization in the Solicitor
General’s Office, 71 J. POL. 224, 233 fig.2 (2009).
68. See Millett, supra note 3; John G. Roberts, Jr., Riding the Coattails of the Solicitor
General, 15 LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 29, 1993, at 8.
69. E.g., Cordray & Cordray, supra note 3, at 1331, 1355–56; Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy
Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court: Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar,
96 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1519 n.140 (2008) (describing the development of OSG participation in a
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OSG’s amicus “activism” have not focused on the distinct advantages it
has in not only filing briefs but arguing as an amicus.70 This Article
aims to fill that gap.
II. DOCUMENTING AMICUS ORAL ARGUMENT
PRACTICE AT THE SUPREME COURT
This Part documents how amicus oral argument has grown
dramatically since the early nineteenth century and that the SG has
been the main generator of this growth. We begin with quantitative
analysis and proceed to a qualitative discussion of four periods of the
Court’s history.
A. Quantitative Account
Our analysis primarily relies on an original dataset of all
motions for amicus oral argument. We constructed this dataset with
records from the 131 annual volumes of the Journal of the Supreme
Court of the United States, “the official minutes of the Court.”71
The Journal contains daily entries of actions taken by the Court,
including case dispositions, bar admissions, oral arguments, and
rulings on motions.
We examined all complete volumes of the Journals, which span
the 1889 through 2019 Terms (as of publication).72 Volumes from this
period are available in a scanned and digitized format on the Court’s
website. We conducted both an automated and manual review of the
Journals, excluding instances of amici appointed by the Court to defend
the judgment below. Ultimately, our dataset included 2,298 motions for
amicus oral argument across 1,993 cases.73

footnote); Karen O’Connor, The Amicus Curiae Role of the U.S. Solicitor General in Supreme Court
Litigation, 66 JUDICATURE 256, 260–61 (1983) (mentioning the OSG’s role in amicus oral
arguments in only one sentence).
70. See Michael E. Solimine, The Solicitor General Unbound: Amicus Curiae Activism and
Deference in the Supreme Court, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1183, 1189 (2013) (outlining the article’s focus
on briefs filed by the OSG rather than oral arguments made by the OSG).
71. Journal, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/journal.aspx (last
visited Dec. 19, 2020) [https://perma.cc/M67W-BBEJ].
72. After contacting the Supreme Court Public Information Office, the Library of Congress,
and the National Archives, we were unable to locate earlier editions of the Journal.
73. This count excludes thirty-nine motions for amicus oral argument made in thirty-three
cases that either did not result in an opinion (for example, because they were dismissed as
improvidently granted) or did not ultimately have oral argument (usually cases decided
per curium).
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1. The Rise of Amicus Oral Argument
Both in raw numbers and as a percentage of the Court’s docket,
the rise in amicus oral argument has been dramatic. As shown in
Figures 1 and 2, amicus oral argument was very uncommon from 1889
through the 1950s. The practice grew steeply through the second half
of the twentieth century and, by the late 2010s, occurred in 40%–60%
of the Court’s argued cases in a given Term.
Much of this growth occurred in the 1960s, 1980s, 1990s, and
2000s. In each of these decades, the percentage of cases featuring
amicus oral argument rose by 50%–100% over the previous decade.
Since then, the number of cases with amicus oral argument has
continued to rise. In the last ten Terms, 47% of all cases have featured
amicus oral argument.
FIGURE 1: PERCENTAGE OF CASES WITH AMICUS ORAL ARGUMENT

FIGURE 2: NUMBER OF CASES WITH AMICUS ORAL ARGUMENT
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Our data show that the Court has exercised substantial
discretion over amicus oral argument motions. As Figure 3 illustrates,
there have been periods when the Court regularly denied such motions,
especially in the 1980s. Under the Rules of the Supreme Court, denials
should be more common in cases where the party that the amicus
supports has withheld consent for the amicus to participate.74 We
identified numerous instances, however, in which the Court denied
motions for amicus oral argument made with the relevant party’s
consent and even when the motion was made by the relevant
party itself.75
The rise in amicus oral argument coincided with the rise in
amicus curiae filings more broadly. In 1946, the average number of
amicus briefs per case was 0.5, and the median number of amicus briefs
per case was 0.76 In 2000, the average number of amicus briefs per case
was 5.8, and the median was 4.77
FIGURE 3: NUMBER OF MOTIONS FOR AMICUS
ORAL ARGUMENT BY OUTCOME

Although amicus participation increased through both briefs
and oral arguments, the two practices diverged significantly in who
74. See SUP. CT. R. 28.7 (noting that motions for amicus oral arguments without consent of
the party the amicus supports “will be granted only in the most extraordinary circumstances”).
75. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 459 U.S. 1194, 1195 (1983) (mem.) (Respondent’s motion to
permit American Bar Association to argue as amicus curiae); Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 525
U.S. 1137 (1999) (mem.) (Respondent’s motion to permit Chamber of Commerce to argue as
amicus curiae).
76. Paul M. Collins, Jr., The U.S. Supreme Court Amicus Curiae Database, 1941-2001 (2008),
https://blogs.umass.edu/pmcollins/data [https://perma.cc/7D86-JLV7].
77. Id.
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could make use of them. While amicus briefing is submitted by a wide
variety of individuals and organizations,78 amicus oral argument has
been increasingly monopolized by one litigant: the OSG.
2. The OSG’s Dominance of Amicus Oral Argument
In the 2019 Term, the Court heard twenty-seven cases with
amicus oral argument. In all but one of them, the amicus who argued
was the OSG. That Term is no exception. In every Term since 1980, the
OSG argued as an amicus in at least 80% of all cases involving amicus
oral argument. In ten of those thirty-nine Terms, the OSG was the only
litigant permitted to argue as amicus.
Amicus oral argument has comprised a core part of the OSG’s
Supreme Court participation only in the last half century. Our data
show that amicus oral argument was almost nonexistent until the
1920s, and until then it was used primarily by the federal government
and individual lawyers, likely appearing on behalf of unnamed clients.79
From 1920 through the end of the 1950s, there were generally no more
than a handful of requests for amicus oral argument each Term. Even
this small number of amicus oral argument motions regularly included
parties other than the SG. From 1920 through the 1950s, the OSG
argued as an amicus in a little over a third of all cases in which any
amicus argued. It went entire Terms without arguing as amicus at all.
FIGURE 4: PERCENTAGE OF CASES WITH ARGUMENT BY AMICI,
BY AMICUS TYPE

78.
79.

Id.
See Krislov, supra note 21, at 703.
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The OSG’s share of requests for amicus oral argument began
rising in the late 1950s—and continued despite a change in the 1980
Supreme Court Rules that required governmental entities to seek the
consent of the party it supported when requesting amicus oral
argument.80 In the early 1970s, the OSG made about a quarter of all
motions for amicus oral argument. During the 2010s, the OSG filed
almost 90% of all such motions.
FIGURE 5: MOTIONS BY THE SG AS A PERCENTAGE OF
ALL MOTIONS FOR AMICUS ORAL ARGUMENT

Despite the steady increase in motions by the OSG for amicus
oral argument, the rate at which the Court has granted these motions
has varied over time. From the 1920s through the mid-1970s, all the
OSG’s motions for amicus oral argument were granted, save one in 1958
and two in 1970. But beginning in the late 1970s and persisting through
the early 1990s, the Court regularly denied the OSG’s amicus oral
argument motions. The 1980 Rule revision eliminating the preference
for government amici at oral argument appeared to signal a temporary
change in the Court’s view toward the OSG’s amicus oral argument
participation. In the 1981 through 1988 Terms, under President
Reagan’s SGs, Rex Lee and Charles Fried, the Court denied 14% of the
OSG’s motions, an average of almost three-and-a-half per Term. In four
of those eight Terms, the Court denied more than 15% of the OSG’s
motions. As we discuss in Section II.B.3, these denials appear to have

80.

See supra Section I.B.
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reflected the Court’s displeasure with the OSG’s participation in
certain cases.
Beginning in 1990, however, the OSG’s grant rate recovered to
nearly 100%. From 2011 until April 2020, the Court granted all the
OSG’s amicus oral argument motions.
FIGURE 6: GRANT RATES OF MOTIONS FOR AMICUS ORAL ARGUMENT,
BY AMICUS TYPE

The Court has not been nearly as receptive to other parties’
amicus oral argument requests. As Figure 7 shows, the Court grants
the OSG’s motions at significantly higher rates than even other
governmental entities—the types of amici that the Rules previously
also favored for oral argument participation. Since 1960, the Court has
granted about 41% of amicus oral argument motions made by states
and local governments (including governors, state agencies, state
legislatures, state judiciaries, local governments, and local agencies)
and an even smaller percentage of those made by organizations
(including associations, nonprofits, and companies) and individuals.
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FIGURE 7: GRANT RATES BY FOUR MOST COMMON
AMICUS TYPES, SINCE 1960

Even when the OSG’s grant rate was at its lowest in the 1980s,
it participated in amicus oral argument at far higher rates than other
litigants. Over the last three decades, rejections were few and far
between and then stopped entirely. The denials of the 1980s appear to
have had no lasting impact on how the Court perceives its relationship
with the OSG. In the late 1990s, when Seth Waxman served as
President Clinton’s SG, the Court granted more than 95% of his amicus
oral argument motions. The first time Waxman experienced one of the
rare denials, Lawrence Wallace, then a career OSG attorney, explained
to him these denials happened with some regularity, but that he should
not read significance into them: “[E]very once in a while,” Wallace said,
“they show us that they are the Supreme Court and we are not.”81
As Figure 8 shows, amicus oral argument has occupied an
increasing proportion of the SG’s litigation before the Court over time.
A few decades ago, the OSG argued before the Court more frequently
as a party than as an amicus. But in recent terms, the reverse has been
true. Between its amicus and party cases, the OSG has argued in 69%–
88% of cases each Term since 2001, with most terms falling between
75%–80%. At the beginning of the 1986 Term, in a harbinger of things
to come, Justice Thurgood Marshall remarked in a memorandum
circulated to the Justices that “the SG is about to take over
our calendar.”82

81. Interview with Seth P. Waxman (Apr. 2019).
82. Memorandum from Thurgood Marshall to Chambers (Sept. 3, 1986), in Blackmun Papers,
supra note 46, at Box 458, Folder 11.
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FIGURE 8: SG ROLE OVER TIME

By statute, the SG represents the “interests of the United
States” in litigation.83 This interest is often called the “federal
interest.”84 The DOJ has never issued guidance that articulates
precisely what this interest is, though multiple SGs have defined it as
something akin to the executive interest.85
The only time it addressed the issue, the Court articulated a
broad conception of the federal interest. The 1988 case United States v.
Providence Journal Co. concerned a civil injunction against a
newspaper.86 The district court appointed a special prosecutor to pursue
criminal contempt charges against Respondents. When the special
prosecutor sought to appeal to the Supreme Court, SG Fried denied him
permission.87 Based on this denial, Respondents argued that the writ
had to be dismissed. But both the special prosecutor and Fried argued
83. 28 U.S.C. §§ 517-518.
84. See, e.g., Cordray & Cordray, supra note 3, at 1332 (“[M]ost cases the Solicitor General
enters involve legal issues that directly affect federal interests . . . .”).
85. See Interview with Former Senior OSG Attorney (Apr. 2019) (stating that there is rarely
a difference between the interests of the executive branch and those of the federal government as
a whole); Interview with Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (Apr. 2019) (noting that the executive branch’s
influence would be “diluted” if Congress also argued); Interview with Gregory G. Garre (Apr. 2019)
(“In cases involving the constitutionality of statutes, you are filing a brief on behalf of the executive
branch, but you have a responsibility by tradition and by statute to Congress to defend legislative
acts . . . .”); Interview with Charles Fried (Apr. 2019) (“The Court’s holding in Providence Journal
ignores separation of powers issues. Where Congress trenches on what the SG believes are the
constitutional powers of the executive, the SG has not hesitated to press that concern. Bowsher v.
Synar and Morrison v. Olson are two such cases.”). But see Interview with Senior OSG Attorney
(May 2019) (“We think of the United States as an entity that is composed of three branches, and
normally we can craft positions that are aligned on them.”).
86. 485 U.S. 693 (1988).
87. Id. at 698.
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the case could go forward. In their view, it was not necessary for the SG
to grant permission because the case did not concern an “interest[]
of the United States.”88 Rather, it concerned the “power of the
Judicial Branch.”89
The Court found this view “startling.”90 “It seems to be
elementary,” Justice Blackmun wrote for the 6-2 majority, “that even
when exercising distinct and jealously separated powers, the three
branches are but ‘co-ordinate parts of one government.’ ”91 Writing in
dissent, Justice Stevens adopted the SG’s view and noted that when the
SG is called to represent two branches, he “faces a conflict of
interest that undeniably would be intolerable if encountered in the
private sector.”92
Given the Court’s broad interpretation of what constitutes the
“interests of the United States,” we sought to understand how the SG
conceives of that interest. We chose one Term in each of the tenures
of six SGs—three appointed by Democratic and three by
Republican presidents93—and examined the “interest” section in all
their amicus briefs.94
Across the 141 briefs we reviewed, the most common interests
asserted were that: the executive branch administers or has the
authority to enforce the law at issue; executive enforcement action (such
as criminal prosecutions) depends on the law at issue; and the Court
issued a CVSG order at the certiorari stage. On the surface, these
results broadly accord with what Supreme Court scholars and litigators
have claimed: that the OSG is judicious in the cases it chooses to enter
as amicus, often opining in those whose outcomes will affect the existing
functions of the federal government.95
But upon closer scrutiny, these justifications are less convincing.
First, while a CVSG reflects the Court’s interest in hearing from the
OSG, it is unclear how a CVSG is an “interest[ ] of the United States.”
Second, some cases that implicate the federal government’s
enforcement authority only do so to a limited extent. For example, when
88. Id. at 700–01.
89. Id. at 701.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 714 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
93. The Republican appointees are Noel Francisco, Rex Lee, and Theodore B. Olson, and the
Democratic appointees are Drew S. Days III, Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., and Seth P. Waxman.
94. All amici are required to include such a section in their briefs. SUP. CT. R. 37.5.
95. See, e.g., Cordray & Cordray, supra note 3, at 1371 (“In virtually every case between
private parties that the Solicitor General has entered, the interpretation of a federal statute has
been at stake . . . .”).
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the OSG is an amicus in Title VII cases, it frequently cites the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC”) enforcement
authority as its interest.96 While the EEOC is statutorily authorized to
enforce employment discrimination laws, it brings less than 2% of
employment discrimination enforcement actions while private parties
litigate the other 98%.97
In a small number of cases, the OSG mustered little or even no
justification for its amicus participation. For example, the OSG’s brief
in Reed v. Ross,98 a case concerning the availability of federal habeas
corpus relief when a defendant has failed to comply with a state’s
procedural rules, stated no interest.99
Our analysis suggests that the OSG defines the “interests of the
United States” through norms rather than rules. Our qualitative
account in Section II.B also supports this view: although the OSG’s
interest in a case is often the defense of federal statutes and agency
action, it is also willing to articulate broader and more nebulous
interests. It is difficult to conceive of any case that would not raise a
federal interest within the OSG’s conception. As former SG Fried told
us, “it’s not hard to cook one up.”100
B. Qualitative Account
Having provided a macro-level overview of amicus oral
argument, we now offer a more textured account of how the practice of
amicus oral argument has evolved since 1889 and how the OSG has
come to dominate it.
We divide the Court’s history into four phases based on our
analysis of how the OSG has employed amicus oral argument. We rely
on our own analyses of each case as well as the issue classifications in
the U.S. Supreme Court Database.101 During the first phase, from 1889
96. See, e.g., Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1–2, O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S.
308 (1996) (No. 95-354); Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1–2, Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337
(1997) (No. 95-1376).
97. J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law,
53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1149–50 (2012).
98. 468 U.S. 1 (1984).
99. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Reed v. Ross,
468 U.S. 1 (1984) (No. 83-218).
100. Interview with Fried, supra note 85.
101. Harold J. Spaeth, Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Jeffrey A. Segal, Theodore J. Ruger &
Sara C. Benesh, Version 2020 Release 01, SUP. CT. DATABASE (Sept. 21, 2020),
http://supremecourtdatabase.org [https://perma.cc/J5MH-CQYG].
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to the 1930s, we show that the early amicus oral argument practice was
used by a small number of litigants and that the OSG requested amicus
oral argument almost exclusively in cases involving federal statutes.
From the 1940s through the 1960s, the OSG began defending federal
agencies and, increasingly, civil rights and political interests.
In the 1970s and 1980s, the OSG requested amicus oral
argument in cases in which the federal interest was increasingly
tenuous and the political interest was great. For a brief period, the
Court denied some of these requests. Archival research suggests that
the Court strategically used denials to signal the Court’s disapproval of
the SG’s increasingly politicized positions.102 Finally, from the 2000s to
the present, the Court initially denied a handful of these motions and
then, from 2011 until April 2020, granted all the OSG’s motions to be
heard—regardless of whether the case was political.
1. 1889 Through 1930s
In the early nineteenth century, oral argument at the Court was
very different than it is today. Advocates could speak as long as they
wished, and the Justices asked no questions and paid limited
attention.103 As its docket grew, the Court in 1849 limited argument
time to two hours for each side and began to closely question counsel
rather than listen passively.104 By the early 1900s, the Court had cut
argument time to thirty minutes for each side.105 These changes
increased the stakes of oral argument and the importance of having a
high-quality oralist for litigants and the Court alike.
The practice of amicus oral argument was virtually nonexistent
before the 1920s, and it became only slightly more prevalent in the
following two decades. The federal government was the second-most
frequent movant for such participation—behind individual lawyers,
likely filing on behalf of unnamed clients106—and its requests were
never denied.107 Local governments and foreign sovereigns made few
requests to appear at oral argument as amici, but these requests were

102. See infra notes 229–230 and accompanying text.
103. Stephen M. Shapiro, Oral Argument in the Supreme Court: The Felt Necessities of the
Time, Y.B.: SUP. CT. HIST. SOC'Y 22, 23 (1985).
104. Id. at 25–26.
105. Id. at 26.
106. See Krislov, supra note 21, at 703.
107. Before the 1950s, the editions of the Journal appear to be somewhat incomplete. For
example, some motions are noted as having been submitted but no decision as to their disposition
is evident.
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also always granted.108 On the other hand, the Court denied many
such requests on behalf of individual lawyers and all those made
by companies.109
From 1889 through the 1930s, the OSG requested amicus oral
argument primarily in cases where a federal interest was clear and its
position intuitive. Its most common position was defending the
constitutionality of a federal statute.110 The OSG also entered cases
involving federal supremacy111 and quasi-party interests112 of the
executive branch.113 The OSG only entered cases involving a federal
statute or, in one instance, whether the Senate could reconsider the
nomination of a federal official it had already confirmed.114
The OSG did not request oral argument in most cases in which
it filed an amicus brief.115 When the interests of the United States arose
out of a particular department of the federal government, a
representative of that department often appeared at argument instead
of an OSG attorney.116 In other cases, an OSG lawyer argued on behalf
of an agency but in the agency’s name.117
108. See, e.g., Dillon v. Strathearn S.S. Co., 39 S. Ct. 495 (1919) (mem.) (granting motion for
the British Embassy to participate in amicus oral argument).
109. The Court first invited a litigant to argue in 1926. See J. SUP. CT. U.S., Oct. Term, 1924,
at 182 (inviting George Wharton Pepper to argue in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)). It
continued to issue such invitations until 1970, but fairly infrequently and only to the federal
government and states. Grant rates discussed throughout this Article exclude those invitations,
though the invitations themselves are noted in some instances.
110. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed’n
No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937) (No. 324) (Railroad Labor Act); Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae, Ky. Whip & Collar Co. v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 299 U.S. 334 (1937) (No. 138) (AshurstSumners Act); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Moor v. Tex. & New Orleans R.R. Co.,
297 U.S. 101 (1936) (No. 49) (Bankhead Act).
111. See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. Burnes Nat’l Bank of St. Joseph v. Duncan, 265 U.S. 17, 20
(1924); First Nat’l Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 644 (1924); Holyoke Water Power
Co. v. Am. Writing Paper Co., 300 U.S. 324, 332 (1937).
112. We use this term to refer to a person or entity who is a party “in the guise of an amicus
curiae,” or who is a party in all but name. See Krislov, supra note 21, at 701. A “quasi-party” has
a concrete, and often pecuniary or sovereign, interest in a case.
113. See, e.g., Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108 (1925) (defending the president’s pardon
power); United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6 (1932) (arguing for the validity of a presidential
appointment to the Federal Power Commission).
114. See United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6 (1932).
115. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U.S. 376, 380 (1920) (noting that the United States filed
an amicus brief, although no representative of the United States appeared at oral argument).
116. See, e.g., R.R. Comm’n of Cal. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 302 U.S. 388, 389 (1938) (argued
by a lawyer for the Federal Power Commission); Smith, 286 U.S. at 14 (argued by the Attorney
General); see also Robert L. Stern, The Solicitor General’s Office and Administrative Agency
Litigation, 46 A.B.A. J. 154, 155 (1960) (noting that lawyers outside the OSG argued around half
the cases in which the SG’s office was involved).
117. See, e.g., Consol. Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 513–14 (1941) (arguing for the
Securities and Exchange Commission as amicus).
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Other amici who requested oral argument used the role to
pursue quasi-party interests. For example, the City of Oakland
requested oral argument time in a case involving a dispute over its
borders.118 One state was permitted to argue on behalf of twenty-six
others in a case regarding the federal taxation of state employees.119
The British Embassy sought argument in a case about whether U.S.
courts had jurisdiction over a British vessel engaged in business on
behalf of the British government.120
But by the end of this period, the Court began to shift away from
simply resolving disputes between parties or quasi-party interests. The
Judiciary Act of 1925—lobbied for by Chief Justice William H. Taft—
gave the Court plenary power over all but a few classes of cases.121 No
longer the mere “vindicator of all federal rights”122 for the particular
litigants before it, this new Court largely chose its docket and was “a
constitutional tribunal that resolved public policy issues of national
importance.”123 As a result, it was much more important that each of
the Court’s opinions be correctly decided and carefully reasoned, and
many more entities stood to gain or lose from each decision.
Following backlash to several decisions striking down popular
legislation, the Court also became more sensitive to its role in shaping
public policy. In the 1920s, after the Court struck down several child
labor laws, Senator William E. Borah proposed legislation requiring at
least seven votes on the Court to declare a federal or state statute
unconstitutional.124 This proposal was a feature of the 1924 presidential
campaign,125 and several of the Justices’ letters from this period
indicate that they were affected by this attack.126 A little over a decade
later, the Court again came under criticism when it invalidated several
parts of New Deal legislation.127 Frustrated with the Court’s obstruction

118. See California v. S. Pac. Co., 157 U.S. 229, 254 (1895).
119. See Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 407 (1938).
120. See Ex parte in re Muir, 254 U.S. 522, 524 (1921).
121. Kathryn A. Watts, Constraining Certiorari Using Administrative Law Principles, 160 U.
PA. L. REV. 1, 13 (2011).
122. Post, supra note 16, at 1272 (2001) (quoting FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS,
THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 260–61 (1928)).
123. Id. at 1273 n.29 (quoting Fish, supra note 16, at 476, 477).
124. Steven F. Lawson, Progressives and the Supreme Court: A Case for Judicial Reform in the
1920s, 42 HISTORIAN 419, 425 (1980).
125. See id. at 430–31.
126. See Post, supra note 16, at 1317–18 (describing comments made by Chief Justice Taft and
Justice Brandeis).
127. See S. DOC. NO. 112-9, at 2340–43 (2017) (listing New Deal-era federal statutes struck
down by the Court).
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and emboldened by a sweeping reelection victory,128 President Franklin
D. Roosevelt launched his court-packing plan. This threat is widely
understood as having motivated Justice Owen Roberts’s “switch in
time”129 and having permanently changed the Court’s approach to
reviewing the constitutionality of legislation.
The Court’s new approach treated legislative solutions to social
problems as motivated by the will of the people and thus meriting a
more restrained form of judicial review.130 Footnote four of the Carolene
Products131 opinion, which laid out guidelines defining rational basis
review for certain legislation, captures this sentiment.132 The Court’s
new deferential standard of review applied not only to Congress but also
to the newly created agencies that administered, interpreted, and
enforced the new federal programs Congress created.133
With this newfound sensitivity towards its role in setting public
policy, the Court needed voices to describe the pragmatic interests at
stake in the cases that came before it. In the coming decades, the
dominant voice would be that of the SG.
2. 1940s Through 1960s
From the 1940s through the 1960s, amicus participation at oral
argument grew significantly. Amici filed fewer than fifty motions
requesting oral argument each decade before the 1940s. By the 1960s,
that number had increased fivefold.134 Across this period, the OSG
accounted for approximately 31% of the motions for amicus oral
argument, while states and associations accounted for most of the
remaining growth.
The Court granted 84% of states’ motions, over 80% of those by
local governments, and all those by segments of the federal legislative
128. See Elizabeth C. Price, Constitutional Fidelity and the Commerce Clause: A Reply to
Professor Ackerman, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 139, 157 (1998) (noting the decisive wins of Franklin D.
Roosevelt and Democrats in 1932).
129. But see LEONARD BAKER, BACK TO BACK: THE DUEL BETWEEN FDR AND THE SUPREME
COURT 175–76 (Macmillan 1967) (arguing that Justice Roberts began to change his interpretation
of the Constitution before President Roosevelt announced his court packing plan).
130. See Alfred C. Aman Jr., Administrative Law in a Global Era: Progress, Deregulatory
Change, and the Rise of the Administrative Presidency, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1101, 1112 (1988)
(discussing how Justice Frankfurter and others were “convinced of the primacy of the legislature
in [solving] societal problems”).
131. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
132. Aman, supra note 130, at 1112.
133. See infra Section II.B.2 (discussing Supreme Court amicus practice from the 1940s
through the 1960s).
134. There were ninety-seven such motions in the 1940s, eighty-two in the 1950s, and 193 in
the 1960s. See supra Figure 3.
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and judicial branches. On the other hand, it granted only around half
of such motions made by companies and associations, 36% of those
made by nonprofits, and 11% of those made by individuals.
According to one contemporary perspective, the Court viewed
the rise in amicus participation by individuals and other
nongovernment entities as largely unhelpful.135 Increasingly, amicus
briefs were repetitive of the party briefs, seemed focused on an audience
of clients and donors rather than the Justices, and treated the Court as
though it were a political body that could be lobbied.136 States, too,
began asking to be heard at oral argument in cases where their interest
was no stronger than any other state’s.137 The Court generally denied
these types of requests but permitted (or invited) states to argue when
they had a distinct interest in the case.138
During this period, the Court continued to grant all the OSG’s
amicus oral argument motions, with one exception. In 1958, the Court
issued its first denial of an OSG motion for amicus oral argument. The
case was United New York and New Jersey Sandy Hook Pilots’
Association v. Halecki, a maritime dispute arising out of a state
negligence claim about the applicability of the warranty of
“seaworthiness” to ships that are out of regular operation.139 The OSG’s
brief justified its participation purely on economic grounds: the federal
government was “the world’s largest shipowner.”140
This denial prompted an unusual reaction from two Justices.
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan noted that they would have granted
the motion “in view of the important public interest with which the
Government is charged in carrying out the congressional policy for a
Government-owned merchant marine and in view of the confused state
135. Fowler V. Harper & Edwin D. Etherington, Lobbyists Before the Court, 101 U. PA. L. REV.
1172, 1172 (1953).
136. Id. at 1173–74.
137. See, e.g., Ry. Emps. Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956) (permitting Nebraska to
participate in amicus oral argument in a labor union dispute arising under Nebraska law but
denying requests by other states); King v. United States, 344 U.S. 254 (1952) (rates case involving
Florida railroads); see also J. SUP. CT. U.S., Oct. Term, 1952, at 11 (denying request by Montana
and Board of Railroad Commissioners of the State of Montana to participate in amicus oral
argument in King v. United States).
138. See, e.g., Lambert v. California, 353 U.S. 979 (1957) (inviting Attorney General of
California to file a brief and participate in oral argument); Flournoy v. Wiener, 321 U.S. 253 (1944)
(permitting group of community property states to have one representative amicus at oral
argument in case about federal tax treatment of community property); United States v.
Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940) (permitting Virginia to participate in amicus
oral argument in a dispute about the Federal Power Commission’s ability to regulate on a body of
water owned by Virginia under common law).
139. 358 U.S. 613 (1959).
140. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9, Halecki, 358 U.S. 613 (No. 56).
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of the law dealing with the issues raised by this case.”141 In other words,
at least two Justices believed the OSG’s participation was justified
because it represented the federal government and its skilled lawyers
would be of aid to the Court. For over a decade, the denial in Halecki
remained an anomaly.
Compared to other amici, the OSG’s requests were likely granted
more often because many of them came in cases involving executive
agencies.142 Through the early decades of the twentieth century, courts
deferred considerably to agencies on questions of fact, but not law.143
Beginning in the 1940s, however, the Court deferred to agency
interpretations even regarding questions of law.144 During this period,
the Court also invited the OSG to file amicus briefs and appear at oral
argument in a small number of cases involving the interpretation of
federal statutes.145
But deference toward executive agencies cannot entirely explain
the Court’s behavior. In 1948, the Court began granting the OSG
amicus oral argument in a category of cases that had little to do with
executive agencies but would occupy an increasingly large part of its
Supreme Court practice: racial discrimination.
Shelley v. Kraemer146 was the first civil rights case involving
racial discrimination in which the federal government asked to argue
as amicus.147 It concerned the constitutionality of racial covenants on
residential property. The Truman White House was involved in both
the decision to participate and the writing of the government’s brief,148

141. J. SUP. CT. U.S., Oct. Term, 1958, at 10.
142. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 4, Bethlehem Steel Co. v. N.Y.
State Lab. Rels. Bd., 330 U.S. 767 (1946) (Nos. 55, 76) (advancing the NLRB’s settled
interpretation of the NLRA).
143. Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 YALE
L.J. 908, 969 (2017). This deference was justified primarily on the basis of agency expertise. John
J. Coughlin, The History of the Judicial Review of Administrative Power and the Future of
Regulatory Governance, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 89, 114 (2001); Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in
Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1193–94 (1986). During this period, even when a
member of the OSG represented the government at oral argument (as is almost always the case
today), its amicus briefs were often filed in the name of an executive agency. See, e.g., Brief for the
NLRB as Amicus Curiae, Int’l Union of United Auto. v. O’Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950) (No. 456).
144. Bamzai, supra note 143, at 997–1000.
145. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1, Pac. Coast Dairy, Inc. v. Dep’t
of Agric., 318 U.S. 285 (1943) (No. 275); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 7, Wash.
Terminal Co. v. Boswell, 319 U.S. 732 (1943) (No. 28).
146. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
147. This is based on our review of all pre-Shelley cases in which the federal government
requested amicus oral argument.
148. Philip Elman & Norman Silber, The Solicitor General’s Office, Justice Frankfurter, and
Civil Rights Litigation, 1946-1960: An Oral History, 100 HARV. L. REV. 817, 818-19 (1987).
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which, unusually, featured the AG’s name before the SG’s.149 The
government extensively justified the “interest[ ] of the United States”
in a section that spanned twenty-five pages.150 (Today, interest sections
are often only a paragraph long.151) The interest statement referenced
officials from agencies ranging from the Housing and Home Finance
Agency to the State Department.152 It began, “The Federal Government
has a special responsibility for the protection of the fundamental civil
rights guaranteed to the people by the Constitution and laws of the
United States.”153
The statement adopts an extraordinarily expansive view of the
federal interest. Under this view, the federal government has an
interest in any case involving constitutional interpretation of civil
rights—even if federal law and administrative policy are silent on the
issue. When Shelley was being litigated at the Supreme Court, federal
prohibitions on racial discrimination were minimal.154 Thus, the
Truman Administration could support whichever side of the case it
favored politically.
The white property owners involved in the case wrote a reply
brief rebutting the government’s participation. By supporting
Petitioners, they argued, the government sought to elevate the rights of
some of its citizens (Blacks) over those of others (whites).155 While this
analysis is analytically flawed, it demonstrates how the government’s
“interest” in protecting constitutional rights generally did not dictate
its position in a case about what those rights in fact are. The OSG’s
position in race discrimination cases since Shelley v. Kraemer has
generally turned on which party controls the executive branch.156
149. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 123, Shelley, 334 U.S. 1 (Nos. 72, 87,
290, 291).
150. The federal government was not required to justify its interest in a given case during this
period. SUP. CT. R. 42 (1970) (repealed 1980); see also CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 196, 311 n.41. The
entire brief was 123 pages long. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 149.
151. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1, City of
Hays v. Vogt, 138 S. Ct. 55 (2017) (No. 16-1495).
152. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 149, at 5, 13, 15, 19.
153. Id. at 1–2.
154. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination
Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 447 (2000). The federal government had
begun to support actions against states to combat racial discrimination, however. See, e.g., Brief
for the United States, Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950) (No. 25) (writing in favor
of Plaintiff, who experienced racial discrimination on a railway dining car).
155. Brief for Respondents in Reply to Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 1–2, Shelley
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (Nos. 72, 87).
156. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Fisher
v. Univ. of Tex., 570 U.S. 297 (2013) (No. 11–345) (supporting university in affirmative action
lawsuit); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Grutter v. Bollinger,
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The OSG submitted another controversial brief in Brown v.
Board of Education.157 The brief again extensively justified the federal
interest in the case, even citing President Eisenhower’s public
statements.158 The AG’s office authored the brief, and the AG and his
Special Assistant—rather than the OSG—signed it.159 Perhaps
preempting allegations that their position was motivated by politics,
the authors declared that “[r]ecognition of the responsibility of the
Federal Government with regard to civil rights is not a matter of
partisan controversy.”160 The school board did not bother to oppose the
government’s participation, maybe because it perceived that the Court
wanted to hear from various government actors.161
By the 1960s, civil rights cases were a significant portion of the
OSG’s amicus oral arguments. Between 1960 and 1969, the OSG argued
as amicus in more than thirty civil rights cases, claiming that local
ordinances,162 state statutes,163 and apportionment plans164 violated the
Equal Protection Clause while school board desegregation plans did
not.165 In these cases, and until the Reagan Administration, the OSG
supported civil rights claimants regardless of the president’s party.166
The SG himself generally argued these cases.167
The OSG began to participate in oral argument in a small
number of other cases in which the federal interest was tenuous as well.
One of the most notable was Baker v. Carr, the landmark case that
allowed the Court to review redistricting decisions.168 The OSG’s brief
listed the SG as its author and contained no justification for his
539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02–241) (supporting rejected applicant in affirmative action lawsuit);
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 434 U.S. 810
(1978) (No. 76–811) (supporting university in affirmative action lawsuit).
157. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
158. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2–8, Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (Nos. 1, 2,
4, 10).
159. CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 26–28, 31–32.
160. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 158, at 2.
161. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495–96 (announcing that, on re-argument, “[t]he Attorney General
of the United States is again invited to participate” and “[t]he Attorneys General of the states
requiring or permitting segregation in public education will also be permitted to appear as amici
curiae upon request to do so”).
162. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1965); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S.
244 (1962).
163. See, e.g., Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964).
164. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
165. See, e.g., Calhoun v. Latimer, 377 U.S. 263 (1964).
166. Brett W. Curry, Richard L. Pacelle, Jr. & Bryan W. Marshall, “An Informal and Limited
Alliance”: The President and the Supreme Court, 38 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 223, 240 (2008).
167. See, e.g., Sims, 377 U.S. 533; Peterson, 373 U.S. 244.
168. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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participation.169 In his memoir, then-SG Archibald Cox recounted
having a “frankly political discussion with the White House about the
position that the government would take.”170
One explanation for why the Court was willing to hear from the
OSG on political cases is politics. During this period, Democrats
controlled the White House—and thus the OSG—almost exclusively.171
The Court was newly liberal and political under Chief Justice Earl
Warren.172 And the Warren Court was the first to issue a CVSG order.173
But even prior to Chief Justice Warren’s ascension, the Court had
granted all the OSG’s amicus oral argument motions. As a result,
the Court’s willingness to listen to the OSG cannot be explained by
politics alone.
3. 1970s Through 1990s
From the 1970s through the 1990s, the OSG’s amicus oral
argument requests grew significantly. This period—especially the
1980s—also marked the first time that the Court denied these requests
with any regularity.
During these three decades, the OSG began to request oral
argument more frequently when it filed a brief. Between 1970 and 1975,
the OSG requested amicus oral argument in 42% of the cases in which
it filed an amicus brief. From 1995 to 1999, it did so 94% of the time. In
1995, then-SG Drew Days testified to Congress that, as a matter
of policy, the OSG sought oral argument whenever it filed an
amicus brief.174
The types of cases in which the OSG requested amicus oral
argument also expanded over this period. For the first time, the OSG
entered cases involving habeas corpus review of a state conviction,175

169. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Baker, 369 U.S. 186 (No. 6).
170. ARCHIBALD COX, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 297 (1987).
171. President Eisenhower was the only exception, and he supported the government’s
participation in Brown. See CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 28.
172. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, POLITICS AND THE WARREN COURT (1973); PHILIP B.
KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE WARREN COURT (1970).
173. The first time the Court invited the SG to opine in this manner was in Tennessee Burley
Tobacco Growers Ass’n v. Range, 353 U.S. 981 (1957). For a different explanation of CVSG, see
Lepore, supra note 58 (arguing that members of the OSG were friendly with some of the Justices).
174. Examining the Operation and Activities of the Office of the Solicitor General of the
Department of Justice: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 5 (1995)
(statement of Hon. Drew S. Days, III, Solicitor General, Department of Justice).
175. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
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affirmative action,176 abortion,177 and the establishment of religion.178
The OSG continues to participate in these types of cases today.
At the same time, the Court generally chose not to hear from
companies, individuals, associations, and nonprofits.179 It also denied
two-thirds of requests made by foreign sovereigns and Native American
tribes. And for the first time, the Court also denied a large majority of
motions made by states, granting only 32% of such motions, down
significantly from the previous period.180 The Justices were much more
willing to grant states’ motions in cases in which the state had a unique
interest in the case, including those involving a quasi-party interest,181
federal preemption of state and local law,182 or a challenge to the
constitutionality of a state law.183 But the Court often denied states’
motions to be heard in cases arising out of other states,184 except when
made on behalf of a large group of states.185 Perhaps in response to the
Court’s steeply shrinking docket and its increased opposition to nonOSG motions for amicus oral argument, the number of such motions—
which had risen fairly steadily since the 1930s—began declining in the
late 1980s and then fell steeply through the 1990s.186
The most significant shift in the Court’s amicus oral argument
practice during this period was that it began denying motions by the
OSG. At the same conference at the beginning of the 1970 Term, the
176. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
177. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1982).
178. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). The SG’s motion to appear at oral argument
in Marsh v. Chambers was denied, but his motion one year later to participate in Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), was granted.
179. It granted about 8% of motions made by companies and none of the thirty-two motions
made by individuals. Motions from associations and nonprofits were granted at a rate of 16% and
14%, respectively.
180. See supra notes 133-135 and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 469 U.S. 1204 (1985) (mem.)
(granting the State of Montana’s motion in case involving an insurance dispute over an incident
that occurred on Indian reservation on land owned by Montana).
182. See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 409 U.S. 1073 (1972) (granting
the Attorney General of California’s motion in case about federal preemption of local ordinance).
183. See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 414 U.S. 1107 (1973) (mem.) (granting Attorney General
of California’s motion in case concerning constitutionality of state law). But see, e.g., Goldstein v.
California, 409 U.S. 976 (1972) (mem.) (denying the California Attorney General’s motion to
participate in a case in which the state was already represented by the Los Angeles City Attorney).
184. See, e.g., Wingo v. Wedding, 416 U.S. 934 (1974) (mem.) (denying the California Attorney
General’s motion in case arising out of Kentucky). But see, e.g., Kirby v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 951
(1972) (mem.) (granting the California Attorney General’s motion to participate in a case arising
out of Illinois and under the federal constitution).
185. See, e.g., Brief for State of New Jersey, Amicus Curiae at i, Zicarelli v. N.J. State Comm’n
of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472 (1971) (No. 69-4) (on behalf of New Jersey and twenty-four
other states).
186. See supra Figure 2, Figure 5.
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Court issued the first two denials in this period—the second and third
ever. One was in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the landmark case that
defined the evidentiary standard under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 as requiring proof of discriminatory effect in employment
practices.187 This was one of the first motions by the OSG to appear at
oral argument that the Burger Court considered, and it came in a case
interpreting a federal statute administered and sometimes enforced by
an executive agency.188 The Court had issued a CVSG and followed the
OSG’s recommendation to hear the case.189 The OSG’s brief discussed,
among other things, EEOC guidelines governing employment tests and
screening devices like those at issue in the case.190 The Court then
denied the OSG’s request to argue as an amicus.191 Meanwhile, the
Chamber of Commerce, which supported Respondents and urged that
the EEOC guidelines were “entitled to little deference,”192 was
permitted to argue as amicus.
The second denial that Term came in James v. Valtierra, which
concerned discrimination based on wealth.193 California voters had
adopted a state constitutional amendment that prohibited the
construction of low-rent housing projects—including federally assisted
housing—unless approved by a community election.194 Plaintiffs
claimed that the amendment violated the Supremacy and Equal
Protection Clauses.195 The OSG’s brief agreed with the Equal Protection
claim and thus declined to address the former.196
It is not clear why the Court denied these requests. The Court
permitted the OSG to argue in other civil rights cases during this Term
and others.197 And aside from Warren Burger’s replacement of Earl
Warren, no other personnel changes had occurred.

187. 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1970).
188. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 4–5, Griggs, 401 U.S. 424 (No. 124).
189. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 398 U.S. 926 (1970) (mem.); see also David J. Garrow,
Toward a Definitive History of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 67 VAND. L. REV. 197, 221 (2014) (“The
justices discussed the case on May 22, 1970, and decided to request from Solicitor General Erwin
Griswold the executive branch’s view of whether Griggs should be heard.”).
190. Garrow, supra note 189, at 222.
191. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 400 U.S. 861 (1970) (mem.).
192. Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America
at 6, Griggs, 401 U.S. 424 (No. 70-124).
193. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
194. Id. at 138-39.
195. Id.
196. See Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (Nos.
154, 226).
197. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Macklenburg Bd. of Educ., 400 U.S. 802 (1970) (mem.).
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The Court also denied five amicus oral argument motions made
by SG Wade H. McCree Jr. (appointed by Jimmy Carter). Two were civil
rights cases, one under Title VII198 and another about affirmative
action;199 one was a case concerning searches under the Fourth
Amendment;200 and a fourth was an eminent domain claim resolved on
procedural grounds.201 The last was a securities case in which the
Securities and Exchange Commission filed an amicus brief supporting
the opposite side of the OSG and was permitted to argue.202
During the Reagan Administration, the OSG’s grant rate fell
under SG Rex Lee from a grant rate of 95% in the 1970s to 91% during
the 1981 through 1984 Terms. The rate fell further during Charles
Fried’s tenure (1985 through 1988 Terms) to an average of 81%, even
collapsing to 72% in the 1987 Term. Denials came in a variety of cases,
including those considering the constitutionality of state statutes,203
state action,204 federal preemption,205 and even construction of federal
statutes administered and enforced in whole or in part by federal
agencies206—including in cases where the relevant agency cosigned the
brief.207 Under Fried, those denials also included cases in which the
Court had issued CVSGs.208 But the Court always granted the
OSG’s motions to be heard in cases deciding the constitutionality of a
federal statute.
The Court’s apparent reasons for these denials were varied.
Some were mundane, including because the OSG requested additional
time for oral argument (i.e., a party did not agree to cede time to the
198. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 435 U.S. 940 (1978) (mem.).
199. See Minnick v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs., 449 U.S. 947 (1980) (mem.).
200. See Franks v. Delaware, 434 U.S. 1044 (1978) (mem.).
201. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 449 U.S. 946 (1980) (mem.).
202. See Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 890 (1978) (mem.).
203. See, e.g., Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 467 U.S. 1258 (1984) (mem.); Washington v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 454 U.S. 1138 (1982) (mem.).
204. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 488 U.S. 1001 (1989) (mem.); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 483 U.S.
1055 (1987) (mem.); Turner v. Safley, 479 U.S. 808 (1986) (mem.); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
473 U.S. 932 (1985) (mem.); Marsh v. Chambers, 459 U.S. 1143 (1983) (mem.).
205. See, e.g., Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 479 U.S. 1052 (1987) (mem.).
206. See, e.g., Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 479 U.S. 1079 (1987) (mem.); Landreth Timber
Co. v. Landreth, 469 U.S. 1187 (1985) (mem.).
207. See, e.g., Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 454 U.S. 960 (1981) (mem.) (denying SG’s
motion on brief cosigned by EEOC in a case interpreting Title VII).
208. See, e.g., Patrick v. Burget, 484 U.S. 1000 (1988) (mem.) (denial); Patrick v. Burget, 480
U.S. 904 (1987) (mem.) (CVSG); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 484 U.S. 893 (1987) (mem.)
(denial); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 481 U.S. 1012 (1987) (mem.) (CVSG); Norwest Bank
Worthington v. Ahlers, 484 U.S. 809 (1987) (mem.) (denial); Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers,
479 U.S. 1081 (1987) (mem.) (CVSG). Because four votes are required to issue a CVSG and five to
grant amicus oral argument, this trend suggests that one Justice may have made the difference in
at least some of these denials.
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OSG or the OSG sought additional time beyond what the party ceded)209
or sought argument before filing a brief.210
In other cases, the Justices seemed to deny the OSG’s motion on
substantive grounds. For example, in a bankruptcy case,211 Chief
Justice Rehnquist recommended denying the OSG’s motion because its
interest was no different from that of the party it supported and because
its arguments were “adequately presented in its amicus brief.”212 The
Chief Justice offered similar reasoning in Lowenfield v. Phelps,213 a
habeas case.214 The Chief Justice’s recommendations did not, however,
consistently discuss whether the OSG offered a distinct interest. For
example, he recommended granted the OSG’s motions for divided
argument in many criminal cases even when its interest appeared to be
the same as that of the party it supported.215
In still other cases, the Court seemed skeptical that the OSG had
any interest in the case, distinct or otherwise. In one case, the OSG
submitted a late request for amicus oral argument on behalf of the
EEOC, and the opposing party responded that the federal interest was
weak. The Chief Justice suggested the Court deny the motion, and it
did so.216 The same was true in Bethel School District No. 403 v.
Fraser,217 a case with strong political overtones but without, as the
Chief Justice noted, “any strong federal interest.”218
Some Justices even questioned the helpfulness of the OSG’s
participation in cases that implicated executive power. The Chief
Justice recommended denying the OSG’s motion for amicus oral
209. Memorandum for the Conference from the Chief Justice 1 (Mar. 23, 1978), in Blackmun
Papers, supra note 46, at Box 255, Folder 9 (Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters); Memorandum for the
Conference from the Chief Justice 2 (Jan. 18, 1978), id. (Franks v. Delaware); Memorandum for
the Conference from the Chief Justice 2 (Aug. 9, 1985), id. at Box 431, Folder 9 (Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.).
210. Memorandum for the Conference from the Chief Justice 4 (Oct. 30, 1980), id. at Box 317,
Folder 15 (Minnick v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs.).
211. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988).
212. Memorandum for the Conference from the Chief Justice (Sept. 24, 1987), in Blackmun
Papers, supra note 46, at Box 485, Folder 12.
213. 484 U.S. 231 (1988).
214. Memorandum for the Conference from the Chief Justice 4 (Sept. 10, 1987), in Blackmun
Papers, supra note 46, at Box 485, Folder 12.
215. See, e.g., Memorandum for the Conference from the Chief Justice 4 (Oct. 9, 1985), id. at
Box 431, Folder 9 (Sielaff v. Carrier); Memorandum for the Conference from the Chief Justice 8
(Jan. 9, 1986), id. at Box 458, Folder 12 (Rose v. Clark). The conference memoranda do not discuss
the similarity of interests, simply noting that the “views of the SG may be helpful.”
216. Memorandum for the Conference from the Chief Justice (Mar. 3, 1983), id. at Box 362,
Folder 13 (Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker).
217. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
218. Memorandum for the Conference from the Chief Justice 4–5 (Jan. 9, 1986), in Blackmun
Papers, supra note 46, at Box 431, Folder 9.
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argument in Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, a case
interpreting the Hague Convention.219 The Chief Justice’s
memorandum reported the OSG’s stated interest: that the United
States was a party to and participated in the negotiation of the Hague
Convention. On its face, cases affecting foreign relations are exactly the
type in which the OSG might be most helpful. But the Chief Justice’s
conference memorandum stated that the OSG’s interest was the same
as the interest advanced by the party it supported, so its participation
at argument was unlikely to help the Court.220
Some denials were unmistakably intended to send a message. In
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,221
SG Fried urged the Court to reverse Roe v. Wade.222 The OSG’s brief
was signed by only Fried himself and two senior members of the AG’s
office, without any of the OSG attorneys who typically write such briefs.
In his personal notes about the brief, Justice Blackmun noted next to
the list of the ostensible authors, “not written by any of these.”223
Three years earlier, the Court had declined to reverse Roe in a
case that Fried, who then occupied the Principal Deputy position in the
OSG,224 briefed and argued as amicus.225 The Court denied the OSG’s
motion for amicus oral argument in Thornburgh.226 The first draft of
Justice Blackmun’s opinion read in part:
Although appellants challenge the merits of the Third Circuit’s decision solely on the
ground that the Court of Appeals misapplied Roe v. Wade and its successors, the Solicitor
General, appearing on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae in support of
appellants, urges that we take this occasion to overrule those cases entirely. For the
Solicitor General to ask us to discard a line of major constitutional rulings in a case
where no party has made a similar request is, to say the least, unusual. We decline
his invitation.227

This paragraph was not included in the final opinion,228
apparently at Justice Powell’s request. Agreeing that “it is indeed
219. 486 U.S. 694 (1988).
220. Memorandum for the Conference from the Chief Justice (Jan. 6, 1988), in Blackmun
Papers, supra note 46, at Box 485, Folder 12. The Court ultimately granted the motion. See
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 484 U.S. 1000 (1988).
221. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
222. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
223. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants, Thornburgh, 476
U.S. 747 (Nos. 84-495, 84-1379), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 46, at Box 435,
Folder 2.
224. CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 135.
225. See Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 459 U.S. 814 (1982).
226. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 473 U.S. 931 (1985).
227. Draft Opinion, Justice Blackmun, in Blackmun Papers, supra note 46, at Box 435,
Folder 2.
228. See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 747.
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‘unusual’ for the Solicitor General, as an amicus curiae, to ask us to
overrule major constitutional decisions,” Justice Powell urged Justice
Blackmun to refrain from “criticiz[ing] the Solicitor General
specifically.”229 He added, “we have already rebuffed the Solicitor
General to some extent by denying his request to argue orally.”230
Similar rebukes of positions taken by Fried did make it into final
opinions that same Term. For example, in a criminal case, the Court
noted that it was again declining to adopt an argument advanced by the
SG that it had “expressly rejected when the Solicitor General made it
in [a previous case].”231
4. 2000 Through 2019
In the last two decades, the number of motions for amicus oral
argument filed by litigants other than the OSG has continued to fall.
No more than fifteen such motions have been filed in a Term since 2000,
and grant rates have remained steady and low. Only one motion by a
nonprofit was granted during the entire period.232 The only motions by
an individual that were granted were by a professor who presented a
jurisdictional issue not raised by the parties.233 The two motions by
associations and one by a company that the Court granted were all
made by litigants who were either experts in the subject at issue234 or
quasi-parties.235 They also advanced unique arguments and, in two
cases, were represented by well-known lawyers.236

229. Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Harry A. Blackmun re Thornburg v. American
College (Feb. 6, 1986), in Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, Box 123, Supreme Court Case Files
Collection 64, 64 (on file with the Washington & Lee University School of Law Library),
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1159&context=casefiles
[https://perma.cc/9RXK-4PFK].
230. Id.
231. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 175 n.11 (1985).
232. See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 1029 (2008) (mem.) (American
Antitrust Institute).
233. See Note, Ortiz v. United States, 132 HARV. L. REV. 317, 319 (2018) (noting that Professor
Aditya Bamzai argued the Supreme Court did not have appellate or original Article III jurisdiction
to hear Ortiz v. United States); see also Cox v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 576 (2018) (mem.);
Dalmazzi v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 576 (2018) (mem.); Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 576
(2018) (mem.).
234. See Alabama v. Shelton, 534 U.S. 1110 (2002) (mem.) (National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers).
235. See FCC v. NextWave Pers. Commc’ns Inc., 536 U.S. 955 (2002) (mem.) (Creditors of
NextWave Personal Communications Inc.); Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438 (2002)
(United Mine Workers of America Combined Fund).
236. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 657 (2002) (Steven Duke); FCC v. NextWave Pers.
Commc’ns Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 295 (2003) (Laurence Tribe).
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The situation has improved somewhat for sovereignties and
states. All three motions made on behalf of foreign countries—in each
case, advancing quasi-party interests and represented by experienced
members of the Supreme Court bar and former OSG attorneys237—were
granted. A motion by the Narragansett Indian Tribe was denied.238
Grant rates for state motions rose from 32% between the 1970s and
1990s to 46% after 2000. As in earlier periods, the successful motions
often involved many affected states joining one amicus brief
(particularly if there was not a group of states supporting the other side
as amici).239 States, even those represented by sophisticated state SGs,
do not garner nearly the same respect as the OSG.240 This suggests that
the SG’s special place at the Court is not driven solely by comity to
another branch of government. Other practices at the Court, such as
the restrictive standards imposed for legislative standing,241 reinforce
this conclusion.
The Court’s modern treatment of non-OSG amici is consistent
with the widespread impression among Supreme Court litigators that
these litigants are permitted to appear at oral argument only if they
offer unique legal arguments or represent institutional interests.242
With respect to these amici, the Court takes seriously its stated
requirement that an amicus’s argument “provide assistance to the
Court not otherwise available.”243 For private amici, the Court
enforces its warning that motions for amicus oral argument,
without permission of the parties, are “granted only in the most
extraordinary circumstances.”244
237. See Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1543 (2018) (mem.)
(Carter Phillips for Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China); Spector v. Norwegian
Cruise Line Ltd., 543 U.S. 1135 (2005) (mem.) (Gregory G. Garre for the Commonwealth of the
Bahamas and the Bahamas Maritime Authority); Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 541
U.S. 901 (2004) (mem.) (Carter Phillips for Commission of the European Communities).
238. Carcieri v. Kempthorne, 555 U.S. 807 (2008) (mem.).
239. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 549 U.S. 1263 (2007) (mem.)
(thirty-seven states); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 1293 (2008) (mem.) (nine states).
240. See Dan Schweitzer, The Modern History of State Attorneys Arguing as Amici Curiae in
the U.S. Supreme Court, 22 GREEN BAG 2D 143, 146–50 (2019) (listing denials of amicus oral
argument motions by states, including where counsel of record are state solicitors general Kevin
Newsom, Ted Cruz, and Jeffrey Sutton).
241. See David J. Weiner, The New Law of Legislative Standing, 54 STAN. L. REV. 205 (2001).
242. Interview with Erin Murphy (Apr. 2019) (discussing her experience representing states
and noting “I think the Court is generally more receptive to hearing from an institutional party
and thinking about institutional interests as something that can be distinct from the parties to the
case”); Interview with Carter Phillips (Apr. 2019) (discussing how his representation of the
European Commission and the Chinese Ministry of Commerce as amici “were worth the Court’s
time because we really had a different perspective and point to make”).
243. SUP. CT. R. 37.2(b), 28.7.
244. Id. 28.7.
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The percentage of cases in which the OSG requests amicus oral
argument has continued to rise. Today, the OSG files such motions in
between one-third and slightly over one-half of the Court’s cases,245
which is almost every case in which it files an amicus brief.246
Several former members of the OSG attribute this trend, in part,
to the Court’s shrinking docket and the SG’s desire to give each of the
OSG’s twenty-something lawyers argument time.247 But that explains
only so much. The SG has significant control over the number of cases
in which the OSG represents a party, and SGs have chosen to petition
the Court for certiorari at lower rates in recent decades.248 If argument
time was the driving factor, moreover, the SG could enter plenty more
cases as amicus, but he declines to do so. And even if this theory did
explain the SG’s behavior, it fails to shed light on why the Court would
indulge such a practice.
The rates at which the Court grants the OSG’s motions for
amicus oral argument have entirely recovered to their pre-1970
levels.249 Before 2000, the Court continued to deny one or two of the
OSG’s motions most Terms. From 2011 through April 2020, however, it
granted all of them. When we asked Supreme Court practitioners what
might explain this perfect grant rate, multiple people told us a similar
story, apparently handed down within the OSG, about a case where the
Court denied a motion for amicus oral argument by the OSG and later
regretted it.250
That case was Rehberg v. Paulk, which concerned civil immunity
from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for grand jury witnesses.251 The OSG,
led by then-SG Donald B. Verrilli Jr., filed a brief agreeing with
Respondent that grand jury witnesses are immune from civil damages
based on their testimony. It added, however, that grand jury witnesses
could be liable for other conduct, including instigating a malicious
prosecution.252 The brief also argued that the Court should vacate and
245. See supra Figure 8.
246. Id. The rare cases where the OSG filed an amicus brief but did not seek oral argument
are largely cases where the amicus brief is filed and argument is not set, e.g., Montejo v. Louisiana,
556 U.S. 778 (2009).
247. Interview with Garre, supra note 85; Interview with Phillips, supra note 242; Interview
with Former Senior OSG Attorney, supra note 85; Interview with Paul D. Clement (May 2019).
248. See Rex E. Lee, Lawyering for the Government: Politics, Polemics & Principle, 47 OHIO
ST. L.J. 595, 597–98 (1986); Cordray & Cordray, supra note 3, at 1341–42.
249. See supra Figure 6.
250. See Interview with Sarah Harrington (May 2019); see also Interview with Senior OSG
Attorney, supra note 85; Interview with Former Senior OSG Attorney, supra note 85.
251. 566 U.S. 356 (2011).
252. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur and Remand at 19,
Rehberg, 566 U.S. 356 (No. 10-788).
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remand the case even if it sided with Respondent because the lower
courts had not evaluated Petitioner’s claim that there was evidence of
nontestimonial misconduct.253 The Court denied the OSG’s amicus oral
argument motion. At oral argument, the Justices questioned
Respondent’s counsel at length about the OSG’s position.254 The Court
ultimately unanimously affirmed the Eleventh Circuit’s holding and did
not address the OSG’s rationale for vacatur and remand.255
For nine years after Rehberg, the Court granted every single
OSG request for amicus oral argument. But in April 2020, the Court
suddenly denied one of then-SG Francisco’s motions256 following media
coverage of the SG’s extraordinary streak.257 It is too soon to tell
whether this is the beginning of a trend or merely an aberration.
*

*

*

The OSG’s amicus oral argument practice started out narrow
and focused on cases that presented a strong and clear federal interest.
Beginning in the 1940s, however, the OSG expanded the size and
subject area of its practice. The Court granted every one of these
motions until 1958, and its denials remained few and far between
throughout the 1970s. These denials picked up under SGs Lee and
Fried, peaking at a 28% denial rate in the 1987 Term. Most came in
cases where the Court believed that the federal interest was tenuous or
that hearing from the OSG would be unhelpful—either because its
interest was no different than that of the party it supported or because
its position was articulated sufficiently enough for the Court in its brief.
After Fried left office, the Court returned to granting almost all the
OSG’s amicus oral argument motions, seemingly without regard to any
of these factors. Today, the OSG continues to file these motions in
almost every type of case.

253. Id. at 29–31.
254. Transcript of Oral Argument at 25, 29, 30, 34, Rehberg, 566 U.S. 356 (No. 10-788).
255. Rehberg, 566 U.S. 356.
256. See Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 140 S. Ct. 2665 (2020) (mem.).
257. See Adam Liptak, The Supreme Court Has a Special ‘Friend’: The Justice Department,
N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/09/us/supreme-court-solicitorgeneral-amicus.html [https://perma.cc/NN6E-JMD9].
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III. JUSTIFYING THE OSG’S OUTSIZED AMICUS
ORAL ARGUMENT PARTICIPATION
Although the Court has strongly stated its dislike of divided
argument, our data show that the Court nearly always permits the OSG
to participate in oral argument as amicus. In our conversations with
Supreme Court litigators, including current and former members of the
OSG, we consistently heard three explanations for this pattern. The
first is technical: OSG lawyers are highly skilled advocates who are
experts in Supreme Court litigation. The second is substantive: the
OSG is the only litigant who can communicate with all the federal
agencies and convey relevant factual information to the Court. The final
is normative: the SG is the so-called “Tenth Justice.” As articulated in
Lincoln Caplan’s seminal book on the topic, the SG is unlike any litigant
in his simultaneous commitment to litigating on behalf of the executive
branch and helping the Court.258 Although we find historical support
for these rationales, we argue that developments at the Court and in
the SG’s practices have made it no longer justifiable to give preference
to the SG at amicus oral argument on these bases.
A. The OSG’s Oral Argument Expertise
The OSG’s litigators gave it a significant advantage at oral
argument for much of the Supreme Court’s history. The need for
litigants who are skilled at oral argument became important in the
early to mid-twentieth century when the Court began aggressively
questioning litigants at oral argument.259
In the early 1900s, there was some semblance of a Supreme
Court bar because the difficulty of travel caused out-of-town private
litigants to refer Supreme Court cases to the local bar.260 But as travel
became easier, arguments were spread out across more nongovernment
advocates, who were less familiar with the Court.261 While a quarter of
the nongovernment advocates who appeared before the Court in the
1840 Term argued two or more cases, that number fell to 7% by the 1940
Term.262 During most of the twentieth century, members of the
private bar did not appear nearly as regularly before the Court as did

258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 3–4.
See supra notes 103-105 and accompanying text.
Shapiro, supra note 103, at 28.
Lazarus, supra note 69, at 1493 n.30.
Id.
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members of the OSG, who continuously honed their oral advocacy in
this manner.263
The rise of the Supreme Court bar since the mid-1980s, however,
has eroded that advantage. In the 1980s, several prominent members
of the OSG—including former SGs—went to private law firms. The first
was former SG Lee, who left his position for Sidley Austin in 1985.264 In
the years that followed, several other OSG lawyers went into private
practice.265 Today, Supreme Court practices staffed by former members
of the OSG and other Court experts are a staple of many large law
firms.266 Some small law firms are dedicated to practicing in appellate
courts, and in particular the Supreme Court.267
Nonprofit organizations, law school clinics, and state solicitor
general offices have also hired experienced and respected Supreme
Court litigators. Organizations like the NAACP Legal Defense Fund,268
the American Civil Liberties Union, and Public Citizen all have active
Supreme Court practices,269 as do associational groups like the
Chamber of Commerce.270 In the last fifteen years, many law schools
have started successful pro bono Supreme Court clinics led by members
of the Supreme Court bar.271 Thirty-nine states have a solicitor
general’s office, and another seven have a similar position under the
attorney general.272 More than half of state solicitors general attended
top twenty law schools, almost 40% clerked on federal appellate courts,
and 18% clerked on the Court.273
From the 2012 through the 2018 Terms, around 40% of
advocates who argued before the Court were “expert” litigators—
defined as either having argued before the Court at least five times or
being affiliated with a firm or organization with lawyers that, in the
aggregate, has argued at least ten times before the Court—from outside
the OSG.274 Because these advocates appear regularly before the Court,
263. See Tony Mauro, Appealing Practice, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 9, 2007, at 14.
264. Lazarus, supra note 69, at 1498.
265. Id. at 1499–1500.
266. Id. at 1500.
267. Id. at 1500–01.
268. Id. at 1501 n.69.
269. Id. at 1501.
270. Id. at 1506–07.
271. Id. at 1502.
272. Anthony Johnstone, Hearing the States, 45 PEPP. L. REV. 575, 601 (2018).
273. Greg Goelzhauser & Nicole Vouvalis, State Coordinating Institutions and Agenda Setting
on the U.S. Supreme Court, 41 AM. POL. RSCH. 819, 823 (2013).
274. Final Stat Pack for October Term 2018: Oral Argument – Advocates, SCOTUSBLOG
(June 28, 2019), https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/StatPack_OT18-7_8_1933-34.pdf [https://perma.cc/8UQ2-BXBG].

2021]

THE LOUDEST VOICE AT THE SUPREME COURT

725

they use many of the same credibility-building and -guarding
techniques as the OSG. Their high success rate in petitioning the Court,
although not achieved by every expert, suggests they perform a
“filtering,” or validating, function in the certiorari process that is
similar to the OSG’s. In 2007, the Court granted more than half of
petitions made by lawyers who were “experts.”275
These advocates have also been successful on the merits.
Between 2013 and 2017, twenty-two groups outside the OSG had at
least four arguments before the Court and at least a 50% win rate.276
These included eleven law firms, four state solicitors general, one state
attorney general, three law school clinics, two nonprofits, and the Office
of the Federal Public Defenders.277 Six of these groups won three
quarters or more of their cases.278
Experienced Supreme Court advocates outside the OSG now
appear frequently before the Court. These non-OSG experts increase
the quality of oral argument while diminishing the Court’s need to hear
from the OSG.
B. The OSG’s Access to Federal Agencies
The OSG’s ability to gather information from federal agencies
and relay it to the Court was also a key advantage for most of the
twentieth century. Beginning in the 1940s, a large amount of litigation
centered on the legality of agency action.279 Answering these questions
implicated formal or informal deference to the agency—which required
understanding the agency’s reasoning and position—as well as policy
and pragmatic concerns regarding the functioning of the federal
government. The OSG was the only litigant who could provide these
answers because it alone had access to the agencies.280
Many Supreme Court litigators, including current and former
members of the OSG, told us that the office’s access to agencies gives it
275. Lazarus, supra note 69, at 1502, 1516; Adam Feldman & Alexander Kappner, Finding
Certainty in Cert: An Empirical Analysis of the Factors Involved in Supreme Court Certiorari
Decisions from 2001-2015, 61 VILL. L. REV. 795, 821 fig.11 (2016) (showing that from 2012 to 2015,
the nine non-OSG lawyers who filed the most certiorari petitions had between 20%–50% granted).
276. Adam Feldman, Supreme Court All-Stars 2013-2017, EMPIRICAL SCOTUS (Sept. 13, 2018),
https://empiricalscotus.com/supreme-court-all-stars-2013-2017 [https://perma.cc/ES3G-7WNF].
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. See supra Section II.B.2.
280. Even when the SG declines to defend an agency’s position, as in Smith v. Berryhill, 139
S. Ct. 1765 (2019), the agency may be prohibited from assisting a court-appointed amicus in
defending its own actions. See Interview with Deepak Gupta (Apr. 2019). Gupta was the Courtappointed amicus in Berryhill.

726

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:3:681

an advantage over other litigants.281 In practice, however, the OSG
rarely cites nonpublic facts gathered from agencies. In our review of the
OSG’s amicus briefs, we found that the office almost never cited to facts
about the government that were not publicly available. In the 2017
Term, for example, only one of the OSG’s twenty-one amicus briefs did
so.282 Most arguments made by the OSG in amicus briefs are legal
rather than factual. The low volume of federal legislation creating new
agencies or giving new responsibilities to existing ones also reduces the
volume of litigation to which agency information is relevant.283
The OSG also has an unfortunate recent history of offering
inaccurate factual information about the federal government. Law
professor Nancy Morawetz has documented how, in Nken v. Holder,284
the OSG misrepresented one of the core issues: whether the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) had a policy to return
persons if they won their deportation case in court.285 After the case was
argued, Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) litigation showed that the
OSG “buried” DHS’s lack of such a policy.286 The OSG wrote to the Court
to “clarify and correct” its prior statement—several years after the
Court issued its decision.287
In Clapper v. Amnesty International,288 which involved a
constitutional challenge to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,
standing was a central issue. At oral argument, then-SG Verrilli told
the Court that the government had a practice of giving notice to
criminal defendants when warrantless surveillance was the source of
evidence against them, and thus those individuals would have standing
281. Interview with Senior OSG Attorney, supra note 85 (“We can be a repository of
information about the federal agencies, and the Court counts on us to go out there and get it. The
Court cannot get that information anywhere else.”); Interview with Garre, supra note 85;
Interview with Kannon Shanmugam (Apr. 2019); Interview with Clement, supra note 247.
282. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 31, Jesner v.
Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018) (No. 16-499). The SG’s brief in Husted v. A. Philip
Randolph Institute, 138 S. Ct. 1833 (2018), arguably also contained new information, but this new
information reflected the DOJ’s decision to change its position on whether the type of voter roll
maintenance system used by Ohio was legally permissible. Brief of the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 14, Husted, 138 S. Ct. 1833 (No. 16-980).
283. Paul Clement has suggested that the low volume of federal legislation has contributed to
the reduction in SG certiorari petitions in the last two decades. See Cordray & Cordray, supra note
3, at 1350 n.137.
284. 556 U.S. 418 (2009).
285. Nancy Morawetz, Convenient Facts: Nken v. Holder, the Solicitor General, and the
Presentation of Internal Government Facts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1600, 1602 (2013).
286. Id. at 1641.
287. Letter from Michael R. Dreeben, Deputy Solic. Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to William K.
Suter, Clerk, Sup. Ct. of the U.S. 1 (Apr. 24, 2012), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/
346755-nken-v-holder-letter.html [https://perma.cc/32R8-TJZU].
288. 568 U.S. 398 (2013).

2021]

THE LOUDEST VOICE AT THE SUPREME COURT

727

to challenge the law. But he said that the reporters, lawyers, and
human rights groups that wanted to challenge the law lacked standing
because they could not show they had been harmed by the surveillance
program—and they had no reason to think their communications were
being collected.289 The majority opinion parroted this point.290 The DOJ,
however, had no such policy for giving notice.291 Verrilli had apparently
been unaware that he misled the Court. He later convinced the DOJ to
change its procedures to give such notice.292
More recently, in Department of Commerce v. New York,293 a case
about whether the Secretary of Commerce could add a citizenship
question to the 2020 census, a majority of the Court concluded that SG
Francisco’s representations to the Court were demonstrably false. The
Secretary and the SG claimed that the citizenship question was
necessary to better enforce the Voting Rights Act and that the Justice
Department had requested that the Commerce Department add the
question.294 Yet the record revealed that the Secretary decided on his
own to add the question and that his policy director shopped around for
an agency that would request citizenship data.295 The majority
concluded that the SG presented “an explanation for agency action that
is incongruent with what the record reveals about the agency’s
priorities and decisionmaking process.”296
The fact that the OSG represented a party rather than an
amicus in these cases might account for what Morawetz criticizes as
“the work of an advocate.”297 But if—as the Tenth Justice concept
assumes—the OSG is motivated to jealously guard its credibility
because it is a repeat player, there should be minimal differences in how
it approaches party versus amicus cases. The problem with the OSG’s
use of facts is that, in most cases, they cannot be verified.298 The claim
is not that the OSG acts in bad faith; rather, it is that the appellate
process is not designed for fact-finding and therefore the OSG’s ability

289. Transcript of Oral Argument at 7–8, Clapper, 568 U.S. 398 (No. 11-1025).
290. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 421–22.
291. Sandra L. Lynch, Constitutional Integrity: Lessons from the Shadows, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV.
623, 626 & n.19 (2017).
292. Charlie Savage, Door May Open for Challenge to Secret Wiretaps, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 16, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/17/us/politics/us-legal-shift-may-open-door-forchallenge-to-secret-wiretaps.html [https://perma.cc/R76W-WRZW].
293. 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019).
294. Id. at 2562.
295. Id. at 2575.
296. Id.
297. Morawetz, supra note 285, at 1654.
298. Id. at 1654–55.
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to offer these facts is not necessarily valuable to the Court’s
decisionmaking process.
Some of this fact-finding may also be conducted by lawyers
outside the OSG. Since the 1960s and 1970s, agencies increasingly
conduct their work in public,299 and federal statutes like FOIA300 have
created affirmative disclosure requirements for agencies. Scholarship
has shown how the rise of citations to legislative history in the first half
of the twentieth century was dominated by government lawyers, in part
because they had access to better resources.301 Today, a combination of
greater litigation around agencies coupled with growth in legal research
technology has diminished the government’s historical advantage—
though admittedly has not eliminated it.302
Some of the most influential briefs that offered information
gathered from government officials were not authored by the OSG. In
the 2003 affirmative action case Grutter v. Bollinger,303 one of the
arguments the Court found most persuasive came from an amicus brief
on behalf of retired military officials. Counsel of record Carter Phillips
argued that affirmative action was a national security issue and that
the military required officers trained in diverse environments.304 The
brief was repeatedly cited at oral argument.305 As a measure of the
brief’s influence, when the Court considered another constitutional
challenge to affirmative action thirteen years later, the OSG cosigned a
brief with the Department of Defense,306 and SG Verrilli proactively
brought up the point at oral argument.307

299. See MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE
OF TRANSPARENCY, 1945-1975 (2015).

RISE OF THE RIGHT TO KNOW: POLITICS AND THE CULTURE

300. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2); see also Agency Practices and Procedures for the Indexing and Public
Availability of Adjudicatory Decisions, 54 Fed. Reg. 53, 493, 53, 495 (Dec. 29, 1989) (to be codified
at 1 C.F.R. pts. 305, 310) (providing guidance for agencies’ public disclosures and indexing, as
required under the FOIA).
301. Nicholas R. Parrillo, Leviathan and Interpretive Revolution: The Administrative State, the
Judiciary, and the Rise of Legislative History, 1890-1950, 123 YALE L.J. 266, 281 (2013).
302. Id. at 390 n.446.
303. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
304. Brief of Lieutenant General Julius W. Becton et al. as Amici Curiae, Grutter, 539 U.S.
306 (Nos. 02-241, 02-516). The OSG also filed an amicus brief in the case but did not mention any
military interest. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Grutter, 539
U.S. 306 (No. 02-241).
305. Larsen & Devins, supra note 20, at 1905.
306. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Fisher v. Univ. of
Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981).
307. Transcript of Oral Argument at 87, Fisher, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (No. 14-981).

2021]

THE LOUDEST VOICE AT THE SUPREME COURT

729

Finally, several Justices have recently expressed skepticism
about judicial deference to administrative agencies in litigation.308 If
agencies’ own policy and interpretive statements are not worthy of
deference, agency operations, as synthesized through the OSG, should
not be held in any particular esteem.
C. The SG as the Tenth Justice
The conception of the SG as the “Tenth Justice” stems from a
long history of OSG practice. It is not clear when the moniker
originated, but it has been core to the perception of the OSG at least
since the 1930s.309 The concept is rooted in the OSG’s service to at least
two, and sometimes three, branches of the government: to the executive,
by soliciting and presenting its views; sometimes to the legislative, by
defending federal statutes; and to the judicial, by presenting the
arguments and viewpoints that allow for the best development of
American law. Because the OSG is the quintessential repeat player at
the Court, it best fulfills its role (as the representative of the executive
branch) by maximizing its credibility before its audience (the Court).310
This role is reinforced by the norm of the SG’s “independence,” a shield
from the political pressures on the AG and other parts of the DOJ in all
but the most controversial of cases.311
The SG’s ability to serve as the Tenth Justice is possible only
because of a professional anomaly: the SG, unlike virtually every other
lawyer, does not have a readily identifiable client to whom he owes legal
duties. Under the standard ethical rules, attorneys are bound to
consider only what is in the interest of a given client and not how a
matter will affect other clients or even the development of the law.312
They cannot inform the Court that the court below erred in ruling for
their clients.
308. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2425–48 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment)
(arguing that current deferential precedent be overturned, which would allow courts to decide
cases based on their own independent judgment).
309. See Stern, supra note 116, at 155 (quoting Judge Thacher speaking as SG in 1931 as
saying, “This duty brings with it a peculiar responsibility to the Court, in taking infinite pains to
see that the cases presented are only such as are worthy of its review” and asserting that “[t]he
Solicitor General regards himself—and the Supreme Court regards him—not only as an officer of
the Executive Branch but also as an officer of the Court”).
310. Cordray & Cordray, supra note 3, at 1337.
311. See CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 17–18 (“[I]t has been important for the SG to be
‘independent’ in order to fulfill his duty to both the Executive Branch and the Supreme Court.”).
312. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“A lawyer
must . . . act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in
advocacy upon the client’s behalf.”).
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Because the OSG is unconstrained by these ethical
requirements, it can serve partly as an advocate for its client and
otherwise as an aid to the Court.313 As a result, the OSG is expected to
maintain higher litigation standards than those of attorneys for private
litigants. The Tenth Justice does not present legal arguments to the
Court unless he finds them credible and believes the Court will also.
Every primary function associated with the Tenth Justice is
premised on this unique ethical status. One of the OSG’s most
important roles is shaping the Court’s docket by deciding whether to
petition for certiorari and, if so, what position to take.314 SGs have
described this choice as motivated by an effort to meet the Court’s
expectations.315 Based on the OSG’s grant rate compared to those of
other litigants, the Court seems to value this filtering.316
The OSG also filters through the potentially discordant views
within the federal government to present only one to the Court.317 In a
series of cases from 1866 to 1888, the Court held that the AG had
plenary power over all litigation conducted on behalf of the federal
government unless that authority was statutorily placed elsewhere.318
No federal court would hear from a representative of another
department of the federal government if the AG or his representative
(the SG) already represented the United States in the litigation.319
When Congress later created administrative agencies, Congress
followed the courts’ lead and generally vested agencies’ litigation

313. See Francis J. Aul, Note, Out of Many Clients, One: Conflict of Interest and the Office of
the Solicitor General, 31 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 475 (2018).
314. Erwin N. Griswold, The Office of the Solicitor General—Representing the Interests of the
United States Before the Supreme Court, 34 MO. L. REV. 527, 532 (1969); Stern, supra note 116, at
155; Lee, supra note 248, at 598.
315. Stern, supra note 116, at 156 (“The selfish reason for the Solicitor General’s self-restraint
in petitioning for certiorari is to give the Court confidence in Government petitions.”); Lee, supra
note 248, at 598–99.
316. See Cordray & Cordray, supra note 3, at 1333 (noting that Court grants approximately
70% of the OSG’s petitions for certiorari); Examining the Operation and Activities of the Office of
the Solicitor General of the Department of Justice: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
supra note 174, at 4 (“[T]he Supreme Court has stated: This Court relies on the Solicitor General
to exercise such independent judgment and to decline to authorize petitions for review in this Court
in the majority of cases the Government has lost in the courts of appeals.”). Former SG Rex Lee
speculated that the Court has a “decisional capacity” for the federal government such that if the
SG petitioned for certiorari more frequently, the Court would grant a smaller percentage of its
petitions. Lee, supra note 248, at 598.
317. Wade H. McCree, Jr., The Solicitor General and His Client, 59 WASH. U. L.Q. 337, 340–
41 (1981).
318. See Sewall Key, The Legal Work of the Federal Government, 25 VA. L. REV. 165, 185–
87 (1938).
319. Id. at 185.
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authority in the DOJ.320 The Court has emphasized the importance of
hearing only “one voice” from the federal government—a voice, the
Court clarified, “that reflects not the parochial interests of a particular
agency, but the common interests of the Government and therefore of
all the people.”321
The OSG attempts to consider how every case may impact the
interests of the different parts of the executive branch. To do so, it has
developed a formal policy of soliciting the views of the agencies any time
it considers entering a case as amicus. The OSG receives written
memoranda from agency attorneys articulating their legal positions.322
The OSG then arranges a meeting with agency representatives and
each of the litigants to hear the different interests at stake before
determining its position.323 The tempering of agencies’ narrow interests
may take many forms, including a compromise position between those
of two agencies, a toning down of an agency’s view, or a refusal to
present an agency’s view to the Court.324
It is only because the OSG has no “client” that the Court can
require it to perform this function, which is considered an essential part
of the Tenth Justice role.325 Many former SGs have agonized about the
predictable conflicts that arise between agencies, which must be settled
out of the view of the Court and which the SG has unilateral authority
to adjudicate.326 There is no indication the Court shares these concerns.
One of the most prominently proclaimed ways in which this
function manifests itself is that the SG sometimes “confesses error,” or
320. See James R. Harvey III, Note, Loyalty in Government Litigation: Department of Justice
Representation of Agency Clients, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1569, 1575 (1996) (noting that the SG’s
office is “much less encumbered by the restrictions on litigating authority and loyalty toward an
agency” than the DOJ generally and that fewer than ten out of forty-one agencies can
independently litigate before the Court).
321. United States v. Providence J. Co., 485 U.S. 693, 706 (1988).
322. Interview with Former Senior OSG Attorney, supra note 85.
323. Interview with Joshua Rosenkranz (Apr. 2019); Interview with Clement, supra note 247.
324. Interview with Harrington, supra note 250; Interview with Senior OSG Attorney, supra
note 85; Interview with Former Senior OSG Attorney, supra note 85; Interview with Waxman,
supra note 81.
325. Stern, supra note 116, at 155.
326. Id. at 217; Theodore B. Olson, Lecture, The Advocate as Friend: The Solicitor General’s
Stewardship Through the Example of Rex E. Lee, 2003 BYU L. REV. 1, 12–13 (“[T]he startling
consequence of my making a decision in these circumstances is that the side that I rule against
doesn’t get represented at all.” (quoting Rex E. Lee)); Symposium, Bush Panel, 2003 BYU L. REV.
62, 73 (“I have always been a little surprised at the prominence of the office in resolving those
types of decisions.” (quoting John G. Roberts)); Interview with Senior OSG Attorney, supra note
85 (explaining that the OSG often gives greater weight to the lead agency, the soundness of legal
arguments, and spillover effects while remarking that “[t]here is no formula, and that is what
makes mediating conflicts between the different agencies one of the most interesting parts of
the job”).
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contends that the lower court erred in siding with him.327 Estimates
suggest this happens two to three times per year.328 Scholars329 and
members of the OSG330 tout this as strong evidence of Tenth Justicelike behavior—although others have viewed it as little more than
partisan politics.331 Confessing error, absent permission from the client,
would be flatly unethical for an attorney representing a private party.332
Because the SG does not have a “client” in the traditional sense of the
word, he is not bound by this rule.
The most central aspect of the Tenth Justice tradition is the
notion that the SG is apolitical, or at least rarely political. This same
neutrality is not demanded of other litigants, who are expected and
required to advocate for the positions of their clients, political or
otherwise. When the OSG litigates on behalf of the “interests of the
United States”—as determined by the SG in his discretion—the OSG
may represent one of two conceivable interests: the institutional
interests of the United States, which should be relatively constant over
time, or the president’s interests, which shift across administrations.
Although the OSG has long proclaimed its independence from
politics, the basis of this claim is questionable. The SG (and, after 1982,
the Principal Deputy as well333) is a political appointee who works under

327. See Drew S. Days III, Lecture, In Search of the Solicitor General’s Clients: A Drama with
Many Characters, 83 KY. L.J. 485, 487–88 (1994) (quoting REBECCA M. SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF LAW 119–20 (1992)).
328. See David M. Rosenzweig, Note, Confession of Error in the Supreme Court by the Solicitor
General, 82 GEO. L.J. 2079, 2080 (1994); Neal Kumar Katyal, Lecture, The Solicitor General and
Confession of Error, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3027, 3030 (2013).
329. CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 9–10.
330. See Days, supra note 327, at 487–88; Stern, supra note 116, at 157; Interview with
Harrington, supra note 250.
331. When the government confesses error and refuses to defend the judgment below, the
Court often appoints an amicus to do so. See generally Katherine Shaw, Essay, Friends of the
Court: Evaluating the Supreme Court’s Amicus Invitations, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1533 (2016). It
is not clear that the Court respects refusals to defend the judgment below, and former Justices
were open about disliking it. See CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 10 (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
dislike of the practice). At other times, some of the OSG’s error confessions have been interpreted
as political decisions, as was the Obama Administration’s refusal to defend the Defense of
Marriage Act. See, e.g., Charlie Savage & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, In Shift, U.S. Says Marriage Act
Blocks Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/24/us/
24marriage.html [https://perma.cc/6T3L-G4VC]. As Judge Learned Hand said, “It’s bad enough to
have the Supreme Court reverse you, but I will be damned if I will be reversed by some Solicitor
General.” Archibald Cox, The Government in the Supreme Court, 44 CHI. BAR REC. 221, 224–25
(1963). Some of these “confessions” also come long after the case has been decided, such as when
Neal Katyal “confessed error” in Korematsu—more than half a century after it was decided. See
Katyal, supra note 328, at 3029.
332. See supra note 312 and accompanying text (considering ethical rules).
333. CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 62.
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another political appointee, the AG.334 The president and the AG can
fire the SG without cause.335 And the president need not have direct
discussions with the SG to influence him. Presidents often make public
statements about their policy aspirations, and an SG who wanted to
serve the president’s wishes could use those as cues.
Dating back at least to the tenure of SG Philip Perlman
(appointed by President Truman), the SG has had conversations with
the AG and the president about the position the OSG would take in
highly political cases.336 In Brown, the OSG effectively transferred
control of its amicus brief to the AG’s office.337
Communication between the OSG and the president’s office
makes sense from a structural perspective. If the OSG is to represent
the views of the federal government, and more narrowly the executive
branch, the president will unquestionably shape those views. Many
former SGs stated openly that they believed they had a duty to serve
the president’s interests.338
At different points in the OSG’s history, politicization was a
primary concern of Court watchers and some Justices.339 That occurred
most notably during the Reagan Administration. Reagan had run for
president on an explicit agenda to rein in the excesses of the activist
Warren Court.340 Observers worried that he would pressure the Court
and the SG to adopt positions out of political ideology rather than
legal principle.341
A memorandum published by the Office of Legal Counsel in 1977
seeking to define the proper relationship between the SG and the White
334. See Griswold, supra note 314, at 530–31; Days, supra note 327, at 489–95.
335. See REBECCA MAE SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF LAW 70 (1994)
(“[The SG] serve[s] at the pleasure of the president.”).
336. See supra notes 146-153 and accompanying text (explaining the Truman White House’s
involvement in the decision to participate in Shelley v. Kramer and in drafting of government’s
brief); see also Days, supra note 327, at 493 (“[G]iven the way that the decision-making process
works, by the time a case has reached the point of possible appellate court or Supreme Court
review, the policy concerns of the President have usually been fully presented to the Solicitor
General by his appointees in the affected departments and agencies.”).
337. CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 28–32.
338. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 248, at 599 (describing the practice of requesting certiorari in
cases that “fall right at the core of the current administration’s broader agenda”); Symposium,
Panel of Former Solicitors General, 2003 BYU L. REV. 153, 155–59 (Starr, Dellinger, and Days
discussing various levels of cooperation with and deference towards White House lawyers).
339. See generally CAPLAN, supra note 6 (documenting the SG’s usual independence from the
president and reasons to believe that policy changed during the Reagan Administration, and in
particular during Charles Fried’s tenure).
340. Frank B. Cross, Thomas A. Smith & Antonio Tomarchio, The Reagan Revolution in the
Network of Law, 57 EMORY L.J. 1227, 1228 (2008).
341. See CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 270.
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House explained the tradition of “independence” as a means of ensuring
that the OSG made legal decisions unclouded by political
considerations: “If the independent legal advice of the Solicitor General
is to be preserved, it should normally be the Solicitor General who
decides when to seek the advice of the Attorney General or the
President in a given case.”342 A criticism of SG Fried was premised on
this view. Caplan argued that a group of political appointees in the
Justice Department, supported by the Reagan White House, put
extraordinary pressure on SGs Lee and Fried. Lee largely resisted the
pressure, saying when he resigned: “There has been this notion that my
job is to press the Administration’s policies at every turn and announce
true conservative principles through the pages of my briefs. It is not.
I’m the Solicitor General, not the Pamphleteer General.”343 Caplan
argued that Fried allowed politics to guide him so strongly in some cases
that it overrode his utility to the Court, by compromising either his
judgment about what constituted an acceptable legal argument or his
commitment to making one.344
Reflecting on his tenure, now-Professor Fried disagreed with
even the premise of the Tenth Justice:
The idea of the SG as a “Tenth Justice” who does not have opinions about what the law
should be is odd. It’s not like the first nine don’t have points of view. As long as the SG
presents an objective and complete view of precedent and the record, he may ask the Court
to develop the law to be consistent with his point of view.345

We do not challenge the Tenth Justice concept, nor do we argue that the
SG’s capacity to conform to it has eroded. Instead, our claim is
that he has strayed from this role over time with the Court’s
effective permission.
Historically, the Court appeared sensitive to the distinction
between the long-term federal interest and the president’s interests: it
rejected some of the SG’s requests to participate in amicus oral
argument when the federal interest was minimal.346 But from 2011
until April 2020, the Court rejected none of these requests.347 The mere
fact of granting oral argument does not imply that the Court necessarily
agrees with the OSG’s position, and the Court has listened to SGs
342. JOHN M. HARMON, OFF. OF LEGAL COUNS., 77-56 MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE
ATTORNEY
GENERAL:
ROLE
OF
THE
SOLICITOR
GENERAL
235
(1977),
https://www.justice.gov/file/21201/download [https://perma.cc/5X39-8PTA].
343. CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 107.
344. Id. at 235–48 (documenting instances in which Fried’s positions during the 1985 Term
appeared to be grounded in political considerations at the expense of strong legal reasoning).
345. Interview with Fried, supra note 85.
346. See supra notes 209-231 and accompanying text.
347. See supra Figure 6 (illustrating the grant rate of SG requests).
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appointed by both Republicans and Democrats. But the Justices’ nearly
unlimited willingness to hear from the OSG nonetheless suggests they
welcome the OSG’s participation in all the cases in which it has
expressed an interest, seemingly without reference to its motives.
Current and former members of the OSG told us that political
cases were only a small part of the office’s workload. This assessment
appears largely correct: most of the cases the OSG enters as amicus
involve questions of agency administration or regulation.348 But even
those cases may have political overtones,349 and the minority of cases
that are politically charged are the most visible and thus shape the
OSG’s reputation.350 As a sign of their importance, these cases are often
argued by the SG or the Principal Deputy SG.
Despite evidence of the SG’s political motivations in some cases,
the Court’s behavior suggests it believes to a large extent in the Tenth
Justice conception of the SG. Unlike its treatment of any other litigant,
the Court has relied on, and even shaped, the OSG throughout history.
The strongest indication of the Court’s reliance on the OSG is its
issuance of CVSG orders.351 Why this practice developed is unclear, but
it suggests that the Court valued the OSG’s judgment even though—or
perhaps because—it lacked an identifiable client.352 Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated openly that he gave the OSG’s petitions for certiorari
the “benefit of the doubt.”353
The Court has also continuously shaped the OSG’s behavior. In
1949, the Court for the first time required that all nongovernmental
parties who wanted to file an amicus brief either obtain the consent of
the parties or else file a motion describing the applicant’s interest and
how it offered an argument not adequately covered by the parties.354
Following the rule change, the OSG flipped from almost always giving

348. See supra Section II.A.2 (discussing the most common governmental interests asserted in
amicus briefs).
349. See, e.g., Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) (upholding Auer deference, a
doctrine with political implications for implementation of the president’s agenda through
administrative agencies).
350. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018);
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013).
351. Solimine, supra note 70, at 1186; Lepore, supra note 58, at 36.
352. Cf., e.g., Preliminary Memorandum, Solem v. Bartlett (Mar. 18, 1983), in Lewis F. Powell,
Jr. Papers, Box 107, Supreme Court Case Files Collection 1, 5 (on file with the Washington & Lee
University School of Law Library), https://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/821253_Solm_Bartlett.pdf [https://perma.cc/H6P3-D8T7] (“I therefore see no way around a grant in
this case, although it may be worthwhile to call for the views of the Solicitor General to see whether
he suggests any good way of avoiding plenary review.”).
353. CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 266.
354. Harper & Etherington, supra note 135, at 1173.
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consent to almost always refusing it.355 Justice Frankfurter twice
publicly reprimanded the OSG for this new practice.356 He complained
that the OSG had improperly shifted the burden of sorting
applications—properly assigned to it as a party—back onto the Court.357
When SG Fried advanced legal arguments the Court believed went too
far, the Court denied his motions for amicus oral argument and even
chastised him in opinions.358 When they believed he favored politics
over the quality of legal argument, some Justices went on record and
told journalist Lincoln Caplan so.359 Chief Justice Rehnquist said he
began looking at the SG’s certiorari petitions more closely.360 When SG
Francisco reversed the OSG’s position in several cases, some of the
Justices questioned him about that at oral argument.361
While the Court has given the OSG immense power over its
docket, these targeted directives demonstrate how the Court also seeks
to shape the OSG into the institution it wants. More concerning, this
behavior suggests that the Court views these problems of politicization
and overstepping as one-off and correctable. It indicates that some of
the Justices believe they can discern when the OSG is acting in a
manner of which they disapprove. If accurate, this view could justify a
default view of the SG as the Tenth Justice. The Court’s willingness to
hear from the OSG at amicus oral argument in virtually any case it
desires, however, suggests that the Court does not—and perhaps
cannot—in fact detect when the OSG is motivated purely by politics.
IV. DECIDING WHO SHOULD BE HEARD
We have argued that the traditional justifications for giving
preference to OSG over non-OSG amici for participation in oral
argument no longer hold. Standing alone, this conclusion does not
explain who should be given the privilege of amicus oral argument and
when. This Part aims to fill that gap. We begin by cataloging
the concerns posed by amicus oral argument: its challenge
to due process in the adversarial context, its potential to unduly
355. Krislov, supra note 21, at 714.
356. Harper & Etherington, supra note 135, at 1176; Krislov, supra note 21, at 714.
357. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 924 (1952) (mem., Frankfurter, J.).
358. See supra Section II.B.3 (discussing the period during which Fried served as SG).
359. See CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 264–67.
360. See id. at 266 (Chief Justice Rehnquist stating that he lost “the feeling that every case is
presented squarely” in the SG’s certiorari petitions).
361. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018)
(No. 16-1466) (“Justice Sotomayor: Mr.—Mr. General, by the way, how many times this term
already have you flipped positions from prior administrations?”).
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influence the development of law, and its threats to the Court’s
institutional legitimacy.
We start with the observation that all amicus oral argument
participation—but particularly by the OSG so frequently and to the
almost complete exclusion of others—creates procedural and
substantive problems. First, amicus oral argument distorts the
adversarial process. The due process concerns underpinning the
American adversarial system presume a contest between two parties,
each with lawyer who advocates zealously on their behalf.362 Unlike
most amici, the parties will be directly impacted by the Court’s decision
regardless of how narrowly it rules and on what grounds.
In many cases, amicus oral argument displaces the parties’
rights as litigants. Divided argument is, as Justice (and former SG)
Robert Jackson put it, “at best . . . somewhat overlapping, repetitious
and incomplete and, at worst, contradictory, inconsistent and
confusing.”363 He offered a blanket rule for litigators: “Never divide
between two or more counsel the argument on behalf of a single
interest.”364 At the Supreme Court, amici generally take argument time
away from the party they support.365 Granting amicus oral argument
requests therefore has the effect of depriving the lawyer representing
that party of time she could use to advocate for her client.
In addition, amici are encouraged to offer legal arguments not
advanced by the parties.366 They may thus undermine or even derail a
party’s arguments. The lawyer for the party the amicus supports may
even have to spend some of her newly diminished time distinguishing
the amicus’s arguments. Even when an amicus adopts the same legal
reasoning as the party it supports, his participation undermines the due
process rights of the opposing party (who lacks the opportunity to have
a second voice buttress its arguments). In some categories of cases,
especially criminal cases, the OSG’s support is only reasonably
available to one party.367
Private litigants seldom oppose the SG’s motions for amicus oral
argument and often solicit them when the SG might be on their side.
Several Supreme Court litigators told us they almost never, or had
362. Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61
DUKE L.J. 1, 3 (2011).
363. Robert H. Jackson, Advocacy Before the Supreme Court: Suggestions for Effective Case
Presentations, 37 A.B.A. J. 801, 802 (1951).
364. Id. at 801-02.
365. See SUP. CT. R. 28.7 (stating that, in the absence of a party’s consent to share time, an
amicus oral argument motion “will be granted only in the most extraordinary circumstances”).
366. Id. 37.1.
367. See infra text accompanying note 430.
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never, supported amicus oral argument by even other elite Supreme
Court practitioners outside the OSG.368 This suggests that parties may
want the OSG on their side because they believe the Court weighs
arguments more heavily when they are advanced by the OSG—not
because the OSG attorney would more skillfully use the ten minutes of
oral argument than they would. Another possible explanation is that
these litigators do not want to appear to rebuke the OSG because of its
influence over the Court and its repeat player status.
Amicus oral argument may also affect the substantive
development of the law. One of the most frequently cited rationales for
permitting amicus oral argument is that the amicus may help the Court
reach the correct legal rule in a given case. Some instances in which the
Court has granted amicus oral argument appear clearly to be motivated
by this thought—particularly when the amici supported neither
party.369 The shift in the OSG’s caseload at the Court from participating
primarily as a party to appearing more frequently as an amicus
suggests that the SG believes the OSG can affect substantive outcomes
as an amicus.370 In some cases, its impact is clear.371
The fact that it is the OSG who dominates amicus oral argument
is particularly significant because of the SG’s Tenth Justice reputation.
As discussed above, the Court defers to the SG in many areas and likely
believes he fulfills that role. Some of the OSG’s amicus positions,
however, do not warrant this confidence. But social science research
suggests that it is difficult for decisionmakers to accurately discount
information, and particularly that from an otherwise reputable actor.372
If the Justices are unable to distinguish between when the OSG’s
judgment—and even citation of new factual information—is deserving
368. Interview with Rosenkranz, supra note 323; Interview with Murphy, supra note 242;
Interview with Verrilli, supra note 85.
369. See, e.g., Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 576 (2018) (mem.) (granting amicus oral
argument by Professor Aditya Bamzai, whose brief, in support of neither party, argued that the
Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case).
370. Cf. Linda Greenhouse, An Old Supreme Court Dream, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/14/opinion/supreme-court-immigration.html [https://perma.cc/
DB8J-9GP5] (describing a memorandum that then-Special Assistant to the AG John Roberts wrote
to the AG that lamented the SG’s failure to enter Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), and noted that
a brief by OSG “could well have . . . altered the outcome”).
371. See, e.g., Megan McCracken, Legally Indefensible: Requiring Death Row Prisoners to
Prove Available Execution Alternatives, 41 CHAMPION 46, 47-48 (2017) (discussing how OSG’s
amicus position in Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573 (2006), influenced the legal standard adopted
in Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008)).
372. Baruch Fischhoff, Perceived Informativeness of Facts, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.: HUM.
PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 349, 349 (1977); Chanthika Pornpitakpan, The Persuasiveness of
Source Credibility: A Critical Review of Five Decades’ Evidence, 34 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 243,
244 (2004).
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of deference and when it is not, their decisions may give undue weight
to the OSG’s views.
Outside of the procedural and substantive problems posed by
amicus oral argument, the Court’s indulgence of the OSG as an amicus
at oral argument even when it acts politically also challenges the
Court’s legitimacy.373 Over the last fifty years, the public has come to
view the Court as a political body.374 One reason for this is its increased
willingness to hear cases litigated by interest groups and motivated by
ideology.375 To counter this perception, the Court should avoid favoring
actors who operate in a political capacity, particularly the federal
government. If the Court regularly heard from the Republican or
Democratic Party, Americans would rightly take note of the intrusion
of politics in an ostensibly nonpolitical proceeding.
Court watchers may also be concerned about how this could
affect the development of the law in the cases in which a majority of the
Court and the SG were appointed by presidents of the same party. In
these cases, it is not just that the Court listens to a political actor.
Rather, some of the Justices may benefit from a political actor who
makes sophisticated legal arguments that advance ideological interests
while benefiting from a reputation for neutrality and independence.
Aside from politics, allowing the OSG to argue as an amicus so
frequently also enables the OSG to amplify its distinctly institutional
viewpoint—that of the federal government—at the Court. The Justices
are naturally sympathetic to the executive’s institutional interests, and
particularly with the government’s ability to function effectively and
enforce the law.376 The OSG’s perspective is also fundamentally focused
on federal power, and executive power in particular. At times, it is at
odds with the views of a majority of one or both houses of Congress.377
373. See Curry et al., supra note 166, at 241 (discussing political avenues of influence over the
Court); Barbara L. Graham, Explaining Supreme Court Policymaking in Civil Rights: The
Influence of the Solicitor General, 1953-2002, 31 POL’Y STUD. J. 253, 266 (2003).
374. See Richard L. Hasen, Polarization and the Judiciary, 22 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 261, 262
(2019); Brandon L. Bartels & Christopher D. Johnston, Political Justice? Perceptions of
Politicization and Public Preferences Toward the Supreme Court Appointment Process, 76 PUB. OP.
Q. 105, 112 (2011). Some scholars have even connected this trend directly to the Court’s apparent
favoritism towards the OSG. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 14-15 (1991) (describing the SG’s “special role” at the Court and
concluding that it “does not comport with” notions of independence and a judicial system able to
defy legislative and political majorities).
375. Hasen, supra note 374, at 266–71; Carl Hulse, Political Polarization Takes Hold of the
Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/05/us/politics/
political-polarization-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/239Q-QTN8].
376. See Cordray & Cordray, supra note 3, at 1338 nn.68–69.
377. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (in which the OSG and the United States
Senate filed briefs and argued as amici on opposite sides). Amicus oral argument motions by
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This is a bias many of the Justices likely share378 and one that is
amplified by the OSG’s frequent oral arguments at the Court.
Given the risks inherent in continuing the Court’s current
amicus oral argument practice, we suggest a framework for deciding
which amicus oral argument motions to grant. Although there are many
conditions under which an amicus’s participation at oral argument is
unjustified, there are also circumstances in which the value of divided
argument might outweigh its costs.379
We recognize that the Court is likely cautious about granting
amicus oral argument participation. When we asked expert Supreme
Court litigators why, in their opinion, the Court did not grant more of
these motions, several told us they believed the Court did not want to
be in the position of picking and choosing among amici.380 In
anticipation of this concern, we propose a standard for when amicus
oral argument motions should be granted and identify its benefits over
the Court’s current approach in Section A. In Sections B and C, we
discuss the primary ways this standard would change the Court’s
current amicus oral argument practice as it relates to OSG and nonOSG litigants, respectively.
A. When Amici Should Be Heard
Oral argument at the Supreme Court must balance dual
objectives. It must fulfill the due process principles underlying every
exercise of judicial power in an adversarial system. It also must
account, however, for its distinct role in “resolv[ing] public policy issues
of national importance.”381 Given these charges, we suggest the
Court should allow amici to argue only if they fall into one of two
narrow categories.

members of Congress are rare, but often, though not always, granted. See, e.g., Coleman v. Ct. of
Appeals of Md., 565 U.S. 1091 (2011) (denying amicus oral argument motion of Senator Tom
Harkin and other members of Congress).
378. Every current Justice except Justice Kagan was a judge on a U.S. Court of Appeals before
being nominated to the U.S. Supreme Court. Every Justice other than Justice Barrett has worked
in the executive branch of the U.S. government. See SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., supra note 9 (providing
biographical information of the Justices).
379. See Solimine, supra note 70, at 1204 (“The dangers of excessive politicization and
disruption of the adversarial process might . . . attend the filing of any amicus brief by the SG. But
those costs are tolerable . . . when the SG is asserting a strong and direct federal interest. The
costs loom larger when the federal interest . . . is attenuated.”).
380. Interview with David Frederick (May 2019) (“A proposal that would spark more motions
for amicus oral argument is not one that is going to be well received by the Justices.”); Interview
with Verrilli, supra note 85; Interview with Clement, supra note 247.
381. Post, supra note 16, at 1273 n.29.
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1. Standard 1: An Amicus with a Concrete Interest
Who Provides New Legal Reasoning
The first standard has two criteria: an amicus who (1) has a
concrete interest in the litigation, and (2) provides new reasoning
(relative to the parties’ presentation) that advances this interest should
be permitted to participate in oral argument. To have a “concrete
interest,” an amicus must have some type of preexisting practice that
would be disrupted by the case at issue and that the amicus seeks to
defend. This establishes that the amicus would likely be affected by the
judgment. Merely stating that an amicus has an academic382 or
philosophical383 interest in the outcome would be insufficient to
demonstrate a concrete interest. “New reasoning” refers to
legal analysis (for example, an originalist analysis) not provided by
the parties.
Importantly, there is a category of arguments sometimes raised
for the first time at the Court that this standard excludes: arguments
principally offering new factual information. Because the Supreme
Court is not a fact-finding court, new facts should be litigated in the
trial court, not granted backdoor access through an amicus.384
By requiring a concrete interest, this procedure protects the U.S.
adversarial system and parties’ due process rights. The adversarial
system presumes that every party has a lawyer who will advocate
zealously on their behalf.385 Granting amicus oral argument requests
often has the effect of depriving the lawyer representing a party of time
she could use to advocate for her client. Under our proposed rule, no
amicus may interfere with a party’s presentation of the case unless the
amicus demonstrates that it will also be affected by the judgment.
Requiring that this amicus also present new reasoning balances the
Court’s policymaking role (in guiding the development of the law for
many parties) with disruptions of the adversarial paradigm (in which
each party must only address the opposing party’s arguments). Because
participation by an amicus who meets these criteria would be
382. See, e.g., Brief of Professor Stephen E. Sachs as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither
Party at 1, Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the W. Dist. of Tex., 571 U.S. 49 (2013) (No.
12-929) (“[Amicus] teaches and writes about civil procedure and conflict of laws, and he has an
interest in the sound development of these fields.”).
383. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Faith and Action et al. in Support of Petitioners at 1,
McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (No. 03-1693) (“Amici contends the
progressive withdrawal of God and his moral law from society through government action,
particularly in our schools, has had an enormously detrimental effect on our culture . . . .”).
384. See supra Section III.B.
385. See Gorod, supra note 362, at 4 n.9 (describing the adversarial system).
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permissive rather than as of right, the Court would maintain the
discretion to deny such a motion on the basis that its new reasoning is
not helpful to the Justices’ decisionmaking.
2. Standard 2: An Amicus Who Raises
an Entirely New Legal Argument
In a very narrow set of cases, granting a second type of amicus
oral argument motion might be justified: when the amicus presents an
entirely new legal argument that the Court should considering in
adjudicating the case, even if it has no concrete interest in the litigation.
Amici who fall under this standard include those raising new
jurisdictional, constitutional, and other claims.386
Because of the oddity of permitting anyone to raise an issue at
the highest level of appellate review not litigated below, the Court
should be very cautious in granting these motions. As the Justices
frequently remind us, the Supreme Court is “a court of review, not of
first view.”387 As a result, the Justices should strongly consider two
other potential responses to an amicus who raises such an issue. The
first is straightforward: in every such case, the Court should require
briefing from the parties on the novel argument presented by amicus.
The second, more extreme response, would be to dismiss the case as
improvidently granted. This action is entirely at the Court’s discretion,
and several Justices have stated that the Court should do so only in
very limited circumstances.388 Firm application of these solutions is
necessary to ensure that this standard does not simply invite
arguments to the Court that seek to overrule rather than apply the law
or that sidetrack cases based on an issue raised only by the amicus.
This standard serves due process interests by setting a high bar
for participation at oral argument by amici who will not be affected by
the ruling. It does so also by ensuring that amicus oral argument
motions are granted under this standard only very infrequently. By
requesting briefing from the party, the Court allocates the primary
responsibility for developing the argument to the parties. Only when
386. See, e.g., Brief of Professor Aditya Bamzai as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party
at 2, Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2165 (2018) (Nos. 16-961, 16-1017, 16-1423) (arguing that
the Court did not have Article III jurisdiction to hear the case).
387. McWilliams v. Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 1790, 1801 (2017) (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S.
709, 718 n.7 (2005)).
388. See Richard L. Revesz & Pamela S. Karlan, Nonmajority Rules and the Supreme Court,
136 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1082–95 (1988); see also I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 426 n.3
(1987) (declining to dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted because “[t]he
importance of the legal issue makes it appropriate” to address the merits).
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the Court views the parties’ briefing or oral argument as insufficient
should it grant the amicus’s oral argument motion.
*

*

*

The Court’s April 2020 denial of the OSG’s amicus oral
argument motion in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District
Court is consistent with our proscription. The case concerns state court
personal jurisdiction. The OSG’s interest statement reveals an interest
that is tenuous and muddled. The brief first noted the United States’
interest in “ensuring that private plaintiffs have access to efficient
forums” to sue companies, suggesting it supported broader
jurisdiction.389 But then it stated that the United States “often defends
federal officials” and seeks to prevent “risks to . . . commerce” posed by
expansive state court jurisdiction.390 SG Francisco ultimately decided
to support Ford, though the OSG’s brief does not explain why.
In the same order, the Court denied a similar motion made on
behalf of Minnesota, thirty-eight other states, and the District of
Columbia.391 Although those states had a more concrete interest in the
litigation than did the OSG, their brief did not advance unique
reasoning or arguments.392 Thus, this motion also would have been
denied under our proposed standards.
B. Application to the OSG
Under our proposal, the OSG’s amicus oral argument motions
would likely be granted much less frequently, primarily because the
threshold for a concrete interest (justifying amicus oral argument
participation) is intentionally higher than that for an “interest[ ] of the
United States.” We are concerned only with the narrow question of
when the OSG should be granted the privilege of being heard as amicus
at oral argument, but we wish to briefly distinguish between the
two standards.
The federal interest has been described by former SG Seth
Waxman as “elusive” and “difficult to discern.”393 In practice, the OSG
389. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1–2, Ford Motor
Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., No. 19-368 (S. Ct. Mar. 6, 2020).
390. Id. at 2.
391. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
392. See Brief for Minnesota, Texas, 37 Other States, and the District of Columbia as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondents, Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., No. 19-368 (S.
Ct. Apr. 2020).
393. Waxman, supra note 7, at 17.
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has often justified its interest in a case by referencing an executive
agency’s role in administering or enforcing a federal statute or the
impact a case may have on the DOJ’s ability to engage in civil
litigation or criminal prosecution.394 Sometimes its justification is much
more questionable.395
Most scholars who have evaluated whether the OSG represents
the federal interest have asked whether the interest touches on some
function of the federal government.396 This framework, however, could
justify the OSG’s participation in almost any case, effectively leaving
the decision whether to enter a case as an amicus to historical
happenstance and the SG’s discretion. When asked why, for example,
the OSG has participated in constitutional claims over racial
gerrymandering but not partisan gerrymandering, a senior OSG
attorney told us it was “somewhat by accident.”397 The AG was a named
party in the case that established the constitutional racial
gerrymandering claim,398 so the OSG filed an amicus brief. Ever since,
it has participated in these cases as amicus, “even though,” as the OSG
attorney noted, “they are Fourteenth Amendment cases on districting,
in which the federal government now does not really have a role.”399
More complex theories of the federal interest, as Michael
Solimine has argued, might look to whether a case “may have a
perceptible effect on the enforcement of federal law by some part of the
executive branch, or where there has been a tradition of expertise
centered in the executive branch (e.g., foreign affairs).” 400 But even this
definition looks only to whether an interest exists rather than whether
the SG advances those interests. In cases where the OSG advances a
theory that undermines, for example, an agency’s enforcement policy,401
the OSG cannot be said to be advancing a concrete interest.
We do not suggest that the OSG violates its statutory mandate
when it lacks a concrete interest. Rather, we propose that in these cases,

394. See supra Section II.A (finding that the most common interests asserted in OSG amicus
briefs concerned existing federal functions).
395. See supra Section II.A (listing examples).
396. See, e.g., Cordray & Cordray, supra note 3, at 1371.
397. Interview with Senior OSG Attorney, supra note 85 (“We entered our first racial
gerrymandering case somewhat by accident. . . . If we had to make an original decision today about
whether to enter those cases as an amicus, maybe we would not.”).
398. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
399. Interview with Senior OSG Attorney, supra note 85.
400. Solimine, supra note 70, at 1206.
401. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance in No. 17-1618
and Reversal in No. 17-1623 at 9, Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (Nos. 17-1618,
17-1623) (adopting a position contrary to the EEOC’s enforcement policy).
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the OSG—like any other litigant—should not be granted amicus oral
argument time. Below, we highlight three categories of cases where the
OSG’s docket would be most affected: cases without a concrete federal
interest, cases against the federal interest, and cases without
new reasoning.
1. Cases Without a Concrete Federal Interest
Every Term, the OSG participates as amicus in several
politically salient cases. In many of them, the OSG claims to defend the
“federal interest” but cannot point to any preexisting federal practice or
regulation that would be disrupted by the upcoming ruling. The OSG
should not be granted amicus oral argument time in these cases unless
they fall under Standard 2.
For example, the 2018 case Janus v. American Federation of
State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31 (“AFSCME”)
concerned the legality of agency fees.402 These fees are payments made
by nonunion members to public sector unions. Mark Janus brought a
First Amendment claim against AFSCME and the State of Illinois,
arguing the mandatory fees constituted compelled political speech. The
United States was not a party, but SG Francisco filed an amicus brief
supporting Janus. The principal federal interest stated was as the
“nation’s largest public employer.”403 The federal government, however,
has no practice of imposing agency fees, and a 1978 statute prevents it
from doing so.404 In filing the brief, the OSG was defending a principle—
not a federal practice.
Two years earlier, then-SG Verrilli had argued as amicus in
Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, which presented the
same question as in Janus.405 He was similarly unable to articulate a
concrete federal interest, principally referencing federal statutes that
regulate agency fees in the private sector. Unlike Francisco, Verrilli’s
brief supported the union.

402. 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2459–60 (2018).
403. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1, Janus, 138 S.
Ct. 2448 (No. 16-1466). Other federal interests that the United States discussed were equally
unpersuasive. It cited federal statutes addressing the legality of agency fees in the private sector
(which implicates a separate theory of state action under the First Amendment) and past amicus
participation in similar cases. Id.
404. 5 U.S.C. § 7102.
405. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1, Friedrichs v.
Cal. Tchrs. Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (No. 14-915).
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When SG Francisco argued in Janus, Justice Sotomayor asked
him about the change in the OSG’s position.406 And for good reason. In
the two years between Friedrichs and Janus, no new facts or law had
developed. The only thing that changed was the party of the president
and, by extension, the SG. This pair of cases illustrates how the lack of
a concrete interest can enable the SG to take on political or ideological
positions. By allowing the SG to participate in oral argument, the Court
lets the OSG—cloaked in a credibility based on its proclaimed
commitment to “justice”—benefit one side or the other at the SG’s
discretion. Giving the OSG a megaphone through which to voice its
purely political position undermines the Court’s legitimacy. Because
the SG lacked a concrete interest in the public sector unions litigation,
his motions for amicus oral argument in Janus and Friedrichs should
have been denied.
A similar juxtaposition appeared in the 2019 Term. In 2016,
then-SG Verrilli entered Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt as an
amicus on the side of the abortion provider.407 That case concerned
regulations on abortion providers very similar to those at issue in June
Medical Services v. Gee, a case SG Francisco entered as an amicus on
the opposite side.408 The OSG’s brief not only cited the office’s
participation in Whole Woman’s Health as justifying its participation in
June Medical Services, but it also argued that the precedent be
“narrowed or overruled.”409
In many cases, however, the OSG’s position at amicus oral
argument has advanced a concrete federal interest. Examples include
cases concerning federal preemption,410 Bivens actions,411 and the
constitutionality of federal statutes.412 In those types of cases, its
participation in amicus oral argument is justified if it provides new
legal reasoning.
406. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (No. 16-1466)
(“Justice Sotomayor: Mr.—Mr. General, by the way, how many times this term already have you
flipped positions from prior administrations?”).
407. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal, Whole Woman’s
Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (No. 15-274).
408. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur for Lack of Third-Party
Standing or Affirmance on the Merits, June Med. Servs. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020) (Nos. 181323, 18-1460).
409. Id. at 5.
410. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1, Va.
Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894 (2019) (No. 16-1275).
411. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1–2, Hui
v. Castaneda, 559 U.S. 799 (2010) (No. 08-1529).
412. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1, Bank
Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016) (No. 14-770).
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2. Cases Against the Federal Interest
In some rare cases, the OSG’s position not only fails to defend an
existing practice but actually undermines it. In such cases, the OSG
does not advance a concrete interest, and therefore its motion for
amicus oral argument should be denied unless it satisfies Standard 2.
A case that illustrates this issue is Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd.
v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, which presented a constitutional
challenge to Colorado’s public accommodations law.413 In its amicus
brief, the OSG noted that Colorado’s public accommodations law has
multiple analogues in federal statutes, such as the Civil Rights Act of
1964.414 But the OSG’s position was that the Colorado law was
unconstitutional. Had the Court struck down the law, large parts of the
federal antidiscrimination structure would have come under attack.415
The other interest that the OSG offered—the “substantial interest in
the preservation of constitutional rights of free expression”416—would
not meet Standard 1. A general desire to protect constitutional rights is
not a concrete interest. Because the SG did not advance an entirely new
argument in Masterpiece, his motion for amicus oral argument would
have been denied under our rule.
3. Cases Without New Reasoning
When the SG considers whether to enter a case as amicus, the
decision turns on the subject of the case—in other words, whether the
case implicates the federal government or a topic on which the SG either
wants to or believes the office should opine.417 He does not consider,
however, whether the office will present arguments not previously
raised by the parties when it decides whether to file an amicus brief.
Because the OSG has a policy of requesting oral argument in every case

413. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
414. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1, Masterpiece
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111).
415. Mark Walsh, Speech, Religion and Bias All Weighed in Masterpiece Cakeshop Case,
A.B.A. J. (Nov. 1, 2017), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/speech_religion_bias_
masterpiece_cakeshop/P1 [https://perma.cc/SP8R-AB43]; Jeffrey Toobin, Justices Ginsburg and
Kagan Ask About the Artistry of Wedding Cakes, NEW YORKER (Dec. 6, 2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/justices-ginsburg-and-kagan-ask-about-theartistry-of-wedding-cakes [https://perma.cc/FRV7-BXGH].
416. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1, Masterpiece
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111).
417. Cordray & Cordray, supra note 3, at 1332–33, n.46.
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in which it files a brief,418 it regularly participates in oral argument as
an amicus although it does not make any novel legal arguments.
This phenomenon is most prevalent in cases where the OSG’s
interest is not distinct from that of the party it supports. In our
conversations with Supreme Court advocates, one in particular came
up repeatedly: criminal prosecutions. Not only does the OSG frequently
enter criminal cases arising out of state convictions as an amicus in
support of the state,419 but the OSG also has an informal policy against
opposing a state in a criminal case.420 In these cases, the OSG’s interest
is grounded in the federal government’s role as prosecutor and is
unlikely to be different from that of the state.
The similarity between the OSG’s amicus brief and Montana’s
merits brief in Betterman v. Montana is illustrative.421 Betterman
concerned whether the Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause applies
to the sentencing phase of a criminal case. The OSG’s interest in the
case was that “[t]he Court’s resolution of that issue will apply to similar
claims in federal prosecutions.”422 The SG made all the same legal
arguments as Montana and justified them on the same bases.423 The
Court nonetheless permitted the SG to participate as amicus.424
In cases where the OSG presents neither a distinct interest nor
novel reasoning relative to the parties, the Court is unjustified in
hearing from OSG attorneys at oral argument. The OSG’s participation
undermines the parties’ adversarial interests, and there is no reason to
believe OSG attorneys would offer any incremental help to the Court.
C. Application to Other Parties
Because of the OSG’s virtual monopoly on amicus oral
argument, the Court rarely hears from other amici. Between the 2010
418. See supra note 174 (statement of former SG Drew Days III).
419. Andrew Manuel Crespo, Regaining Perspective: Constitutional Criminal Adjudication in
the U.S. Supreme Court, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1985, 1989 (2016).
420. See Interview with Waxman, supra note 81 (“The office generally does not enter a
criminal case as an amicus on the side opposite a state. If they do not want to support the state in
a criminal case, they will just stay out of it.”); Interview with Shanmugam, supra note 281 (“In
criminal cases, the Solicitor General is only ever going to enter the case on one side. If you
represent the criminal defendant, you usually do not even need to call.”); Interview with Senior
OSG Attorney, supra note 85 (“In criminal cases, we know that if we are going to enter the case as
an amicus we will do so on a particular side.”).
421. 136 S. Ct. 1609 (2016).
422. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 1, Betterman,
136 S. Ct. 1609 (No. 14-1457).
423. Compare id., with Brief for Respondent, Betterman, 136 S. Ct. 1609 (No. 14-1457).
424. See Betterman v. Montana, 136 S. Ct. 1400 (2016) (mem.).
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and 2019 Terms, the Court granted only fifteen amicus oral argument
motions made by parties other than the OSG. Five of these were made
by members of the federal legislature,425 one by a state legislature,426
five by states,427 one by a foreign sovereign entity,428 and three by a
law professor.429
Our framework would likely increase amicus oral argument
participation by a variety of these litigants. Below, we highlight three
types of cases in which the Court would likely hear more frequently
from amici other than the OSG—criminal cases, cases involving state
interests, and cases vindicating the federal interest—and how this
would improve the Court’s decisionmaking process.
1. Criminal Cases
Under our proposal, the Court should more frequently grant
amicus oral argument to amici who support the defendant in criminal
cases.430 There are two reasons why these amici may be helpful at oral
argument. First, criminal defendants are more likely than other
categories of parties to be represented before the Court by the same
lawyer who represented them in the trial or lower appellate courts.431
Although many of these lawyers have limited appellate experience and
perhaps no experience before the Court, they may refuse offers by

425. See Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 991 (2020) (mem.) (United
States House of Representatives); Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 1543 (2019) (mem.)
(United States House of Representatives); United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 1539 (2016) (mem.)
(Unites States House of Representatives); NLRB v. Canning, 571 U.S. 1092 (2013) (mem.) (Senator
Mitch McConnell et al.); McCutcheon v. FEC, 570 U.S. 944 (2013) (mem.) (Senator
Mitch McConnell).
426. See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 52 (2017) (mem.) (Wisconsin State Senate and Wisconsin
State Assembly).
427. See Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Blair, 139 S. Ct. 783 (2019) (mem.) (Illinois
et al.); Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 582 (2018) (mem.) (Texas et al.); Sturgeon v. Frost, 139
S. Ct. 357 (2018) (mem.) (Alaska); Sturgeon v. Masica, 577 U.S. 1047 (2015) (mem.) (Alaska);
Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 547 U.S. 1059 (2014) (mem.) (Kansas et al.).
428. See Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1543 (2018) (mem.)
(Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China).
429. See Cox v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 576 (2018) (mem.) (Professor Aditya Bamzai);
Dalmazzi v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 576 (2018) (mem.) (same); Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct.
576 (2018) (mem.) (same).
430. Others have argued that there should be a federal agency dedicated to advancing the
interests of criminal defendants. See generally Daniel Epps & William Ortman, The Defender
General, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 1469, 1473 (2020) (arguing that a defender general can “move doctrine
in defendant-friendly directions” to counteract the government’s advantages). Because the effect
of the OSG’s outsized influence at the Court on criminal defendants is only one aspect of our
critique, we advocate for “leveling down” rather than “leveling up.” See id. at 1474, 1536-38.
431. Lazarus, supra note 69, at 1561; Interview with Clement, supra note 247.
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expert Supreme Court litigators to take over as lead counsel.432 While
some of these lawyers do a terrific job at oral argument, others are less
successful.433 Regardless of the importance of skilled advocacy before
the Court, it is inappropriate and unconstitutional to force the
appointment of new counsel.434 Allowing an amicus who has a concrete
interest in the litigation—such as the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers—to argue in support of this defendant may result in
a fairer and more informed process.
A second reason why the Court should hear from amici in these
cases is the same argument we frequently heard for why the Court
might want to hear from the OSG in these cases. According to Supreme
Court litigators, the OSG is concerned in criminal cases with the
formulation of a sound rule rather than with—as the state usually is—
the preservation of the criminal conviction at issue.435 An amicus
supporting a criminal defendant can serve the same function. A lawyer
who represents a criminal defendant is ethically obligated to advance
that client’s interests, regardless of the impact the Court’s decision may
have on all her other clients or on the development of the law
generally.436 Because of the stakes, the differences in the law and
practice across jurisdictions, and the fact-specific nature of criminal
prosecutions, the risk that one criminal defendant’s interest in the
formation of law diverges from that of another is high. This may lead
the lawyer to advocate for a rule that is undesirable when applied more
broadly. An amicus may help the Court formulate a rule that is both
legally sound and practically viable.

432. See Crespo, supra note 419, at 2008 (finding that, from 2005 through 2015, 67% of
criminal defendants were represented by lawyers making their first Supreme Court appearance,
compared with 48% of civil litigants); Lazarus, supra note 69, at 1561:
Many criminal defense attorneys, including counsel appointed at trial who may not
themselves have significant criminal law expertise, not only insist on maintaining their
status as lead counsel once it has become a Supreme Court case, but decline the offers
of experts in Supreme Court advocacy for significant assistance in the preparation of
briefs and the presentation of oral argument.
433. See William C. Kinder, Note, Putting Justice Kagan’s “Hobbyhorse” Through Its Paces:
An Examination of the Criminal Defense Advocacy Gap at the U.S. Supreme Court, 103 GEO. L.J.
227, 228 nn.1–2 (2014).
434. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147-48 (2006) (holding that there is
a Sixth Amendment right to retain counsel of one’s choice).
435. Interview with Harrington, supra note 250.
436. Lawrence J. Fox & Susan R. Martyn, Monroe Freedman’s Contributions to Lawyers:
Engagement, Energy, and Ethics, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 635, 645 (2016).
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2. Cases Involving State Interests
The Court should also hear more frequently from state amici in
cases in which a state is not a party but has a quasi-party interest.437
Recently, litigator Dan Schweitzer catalogued every case between 1996
and 2016 in which a state requested amicus oral argument.438 He
concluded that, in the 2014 through 2016 Terms, the Court granted
these requests when the “states—based on their status as sovereigns—
genuinely had a distinct perspective from the parties they were
supporting.”439 Schweizer characterizes these as “precisely when states
ought to be permitted to argue as amici.”440 These cases generally
concerned the distribution of power between federal and state
governments, double jeopardy, and state powers under the
Constitution.441 There were no requests during this period from states
in cases where both federal and state governments enforce a federal law
but may disagree on its interpretation, but Schweizer argues these are
instances in which states should be permitted to argue as well.442
These amici would be permitted to argue under Standard 1 as
long as they contribute reasoning not already presented by the parties.
These quasi-party interests are exactly the type that the American
amicus role has historically been used to accommodate,443 as well as the
interests the Court presumably honors by hearing from the OSG in
many instances. A state litigant that can offer a perspective that is truly
distinct from that of the party it supports will likely present new
reasoning that highlights that perspective.444
The Wisconsin State Senate and Wisconsin State Assembly’s
amicus oral argument in support of Petitioners in Gill v. Whitford is
illustrative.445 Gill concerned the constitutionality of partisan
gerrymandering, and Petitioners were members of the Wisconsin
Elections Commission.446 Petitioners’ arguments reflected their
positions as election administrators by focusing on the court’s power
437. For an argument that hearing state perspectives would also address concerns about the
Court’s politicization, see Johnstone, supra note 272, at 598–622.
438. See Schweitzer, supra note 240, at 147–50.
439. Id. at 153.
440. Id.
441. Id. at 153–54.
442. Id. at 154–55.
443. See supra Section I.A.
444. Research suggests that state amicus participation is “most prominent, and most effective,
in federalism cases.” Johnstone, supra note 272, at 603. When state positions conflict or states
uniformly oppose a federalist position, however, the Court favors nationalization. Id. at 603.
445. 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).
446. Id. at 1920.
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over redistricting and the merits of the redistricting plan. For example,
their brief opened by claiming the district court did not have jurisdiction
over Respondents’ claims.447 It went on to explain that Respondents had
not “stated a claim on which relief can be granted” based on the Court’s
precedent,448 and that the redistricting plan at issue was permissible.449
In stark contrast, the Wisconsin legislature’s arguments
mirrored its institutional interest in the case: asserting state
legislatures’ power over the redistricting process in the face of potential
involvement by the federal judiciary. Its brief first argued that partisan
gerrymandering lawsuits effectively reassigned the redistricting task
from state legislatures to federal courts.450 The brief went on to explain
that all challenges to statewide gerrymandering rely on a flawed
conception of the U.S. electoral system as one that guarantees
proportional representation and classifies candidates based on party
affiliation.451 Not all the arguments raised in the brief were novel
relative to Petitioners’ brief, but they were aimed at the entire class of
gerrymandering claims, rather than only the one at issue—which the
legislature addressed in the last five pages of its brief.452 The Court’s
questioning of Erin Murphy, the legislature’s advocate, focused
primarily on the novel portion of the brief.453
3. Cases Vindicating the Federal Interest
In some cases, the OSG represents a party to litigation but has
no intention of fully defending the federal interest, and an amicus would
like to do so instead. These include cases where, for example, the SG
presents a weaker reading of a federal statute than is legally defensible.
Hearing from an amicus who would offer a full-throated defense
of the federal interest would likely lead to better case outcomes. An SG’s
decision to defend a federal statute, regulation, or policy only on limited
grounds is most likely to arise from political considerations rather than
objective legal analysis. These cases may arise when, for example, the
timing of a presidential election means that the SG who petitioned for
certiorari is different from the one briefing and arguing the merits.
Currently, the Court appoints an amicus to defend the government
447. Brief for Appellants at 26–41, Gill, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (No. 16-1161).
448. Id. at 23, 41–59.
449. Id. at 59–67.
450. Brief for Amici Curiae Wisconsin State Senate and Wisconsin State Assembly in Support
of Appellants at 4-16, Gill, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (No. 16-1161).
451. Id. at 17–31.
452. Id. at 31–37.
453. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 18–29, Gill, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (No. 16-1161).
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when the OSG entirely declines to defend its client.454 The decision to
do so, rather than to dismiss the case for lack of a “Case or
Controversy,”455 suggests that the Court harbors some skepticism about
these refusals to defend the federal interest. Our proposed standard
does not invade the government’s authority to take whatever position it
desires; it simply allows an amicus to supplement it.
Additionally, appointing an amicus in these cases would allow
the Court to respond to a problem it had a part in creating. The Court
has been one of the strongest forces pushing the federal government to
speak in “one voice,” even when it allows the OSG to take these
compromise positions.456 Over the years, one of the ways in which the
Court has reaffirmed that it wants the OSG to speak for the federal
government is by denying motions for amicus oral argument made on
behalf of one agency when the OSG already represents a party.457 This
position allows the OSG to take middle positions without fear of the
agency representing a contrary view. Allowing amici to argue in these
cases would permit the vindication of those interests and might
discourage the OSG from taking these positions.
Kisor v. Wilkie illustrates the value that an amicus could add.458
Kisor asked whether the Court should overrule precedent holding that
courts must defer to agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations
under certain circumstances.459 The long-term interest of the federal
government was clear: the executive’s power is maximized if its
agencies receive more deference from courts. Rather than defend the
Court’s precedent, however, SG Francisco argued that it was
inconsistent with the Administrative Procedure Act and had “harmful
practical consequences.”460 He urged that “the Court should impose and
reinforce significant limits” on the deference regime.461 The SG’s
“halfhearted” defense did not escape the Justices’ notice.462 At oral
argument, Petitioner’s attorney answered a question from Justice
454. Shaw, supra note 331, at 1548–49.
455. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
456. See supra notes 318-321 and accompanying text.
457. See, e.g., United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 505 U.S. 1243 (1992) (mem.) (denying the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation’s motion for leave to participate in oral arguments as
amicus curiae); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 820 (1972) (mem.) (denying the
Federal Power Commission’s motion for leave to participate in oral arguments as amicus curiae).
458. 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).
459. Id. at 2408.
460. Brief for the Respondent at 26–27, Kisor, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (No. 18-15).
461. Id. at 12.
462. Adam Liptak, Limiting Agency Power, a Goal of the Right, Gets Supreme Court Test, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/27/us/politics/supreme-court-agencypower.html [https://perma.cc/ZC57-GVJ4].
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Kagan by first explaining that its position was no different than the
government’s (the Respondent) on that point. She responded, “There
might be a problem of a lack of adversarialness here.”463
In Kisor, there was a clear candidate for an amicus who could
offer a defense of the Court’s precedent: former SG Verrilli. Verrilli was
counsel of record on an amicus brief filed by administrative law scholars
that offered a thorough rebuttal to Petitioner’s argument.464 When the
opinions in Kisor were issued, Verrilli’s brief was cited twice by the
majority and twice by the concurrence, which described the brief as an
example of the deference regime’s “fiercest defenders.”465
Verrilli did not request amicus oral argument. When we asked
Verrilli why not, he remarked, “Had the Justices felt like there was not
a sufficient adversarial presentation, they could have asked for oral
argument from amici or appointed someone to argue.”466 Of course, the
Court could have asked. But if it developed a practice of hearing from
amici in cases like Kisor, litigators like Verrilli might be more inclined
to request to be heard.
CONCLUSION
The OSG is the most influential litigant that appears before the
Court. It is more successful at the petition and merits stages than
others, and it is more successful when it is an amicus supporting a party
than when it represents a party. This Article’s account of the OSG’s
dominance of amicus oral argument before the Court draws attention
to a largely unexamined aspect of that influence. From our interviews
with Supreme Court litigators, the industry recognizes and accepts this
phenomenon. These lawyers take the OSG’s special place at the Court
into account, trying to convince the OSG to support their client as
amicus when possible and otherwise trying to convince the OSG to stay
out of the case.
We suspect that the Court has not thought much about why it
grants virtually all the OSG’s motions for amicus oral argument and
denies almost all others. In fact, we imagine that the Justices—
members of a government institution themselves, all of whom spent
portions of their careers at other government institutions, including the

463. Id.
464. See Brief of Administrative Law Scholars in Support of Affirmance, Kisor, 139 S. Ct. 2400
(No. 18-15).
465. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2412, 2421; id. at 2435 n.59, 2445 n.109 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
466. Interview with Verrilli, supra note 85.
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OSG467—have not seriously considered the special place they reserve for
the OSG. In 2014, Joan Biskupic and others interviewed eight of the
nine sitting Justices as part of their reporting on the outsized success
of former OSG members in seeking certiorari at the Court.468 Each
Justice interviewed believed that having these lawyers handle most of
the cases before the Court was helpful and came “without any
significant cost”469—despite the fact that almost all their work at law
firms catered to moneyed interests.
Reforming the Court’s amicus oral argument practice alone
would not remedy the OSG’s outsized influence. We hope that this
Article will inspire a broader re-examination of the OSG’s role at the
Court, and we look forward to continuing to participate in this
conversation.470 Like those who have called attention to the Court’s
unexamined practices in other areas, we believe that the Court creates
significant procedural and substantive problems by acquiescing to the
OSG’s extensive use of amicus oral argument. We respectfully
recommend that it reconsider this highly consequential practice.

467. See SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., supra note 9.
468. Joan Biskupic, Janet Roberts & John Shiffman, The Echo Chamber: A Small Group of
Lawyers and Its Outsized Influence at the U.S. Supreme Court, REUTERS (Dec. 8, 2014, 10:30 AM
GMT), http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/scotus [https://perma.cc/QE73-WEE4].
469. Id.
470. The Supreme Court’s April 2020 denial of an amicus oral argument, the first in a nearly
a decade, occurred about one month after New York Times coverage of this Article. See Liptak,
supra note 257.

